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FOURTH REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

PROVISIONAL SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 4th MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Wednesday, 22 August 1990, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. de RIVERO (Peru)

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General debate (continued)

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The meeting was called to order at 10.20 a.m.

The PRESIDENT said that Algeria and the United Arab Emirates had requested the Secretary-General of the Conference to grant them Observer status. If he heard no objection, he would take it that the Conference approved that request.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT said that nominations for the posts of Vice-President for the Group of Non-Aligned and Neutral States had been submitted by Cameroon, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Morocco, Mexico, Venezuela and Yugoslavia. If he heard no objection, he would take it that the Conference approved those nominations.

It was so decided.

GENERAL DEBATE (agenda item 12) (continued)

Mrs. von GRUNIGEN (Switzerland) noted with satisfaction that new States had acceded to the Treaty since 1985 and that the number of participants in the Review Conferences was steadily growing. In particular, she welcomed the presence for the first time of observers for the two nuclear-weapon Powers that were not yet parties to the Treaty, namely, the People's Republic of China and France. It was hoped that they would accede to the Treaty rapidly.

Since 1985, the situation had evolved positively in certain regions of the world, especially owing to the unprecedented improvement in East-West relations, which had reduced the risk of nuclear war and was making it possible to negotiate important arms control agreements. Détente had also brought about rapid political changes in several European countries, which was also helping to decrease the risk of armed conflict. Nevertheless, although positive that evolution involved certain dangers. First of all, certain States that no longer enjoyed the protection of a nuclear-weapon Power might well be tempted to acquire their own nuclear defence capability. New international security systems should be developed to provide for such a possibility. Second, the opening-up of the markets of the Eastern European countries and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics should not have the effect of diminishing interest in the countries of the third world, whose needs for assistance remained the same and whose situation, as shown by recent events, remained precarious. The international non-proliferation system should therefore be adapted to a changing international situation, and the Treaty might possibly be supplemented by other instruments.

Regarding the implementation of article VI of the Treaty, her delegation welcomed the substantial progress made in recent years by the two super-Powers in the area of arms reduction, especially in Europe. The signing of the INF Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union in December 1987 represented unprecedented progress in the area of arms control, since the Treaty provided for genuine reduction of both States' potential nuclear capabilities, together with an entirely new verification system, which might serve as a precedent for the elimination of other military imbalances. However, the INF Treaty should be followed by other agreements on conventional and chemical weapons. It seemed that an agreement on conventional forces in Europe might be concluded before the next Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. Her delegation hoped that the negotiations on a reduction of strategic nuclear weapons would produce a new agreement in 1990, and, like most States, it considered that the conclusion of an agreement on a comprehensive nuclear test ban was essential for guaranteeing compliance with the commitments made under article VI of the Treaty.

Her delegation also welcomed the signature by the two super-Powers of the verification protocols, which had enabled the United States Senate to ratify the two bilateral treaties of the 1970s on the limitation of nuclear testing. It also felt that the Conference on Disarmament could play a useful role in negotiating an instrument on a nuclear test ban, which was why it was participating actively in the work of the Conference.

It was important to avoid a situation where certain States, in view of the lack of formal guarantees from the nuclear-weapon States, would come to the conclusion that they could ensure their security only by creating a nuclear force. It was true that the unilateral declarations of the nuclear-weapon Powers provided some guarantees, but they did not have the weight of a treaty. On the other hand, a multilateral treaty might give rise to reservations by certain parties, which was why the negative security assurances proposal seemed to have been made at an appropriate time. However, that proposal raised some technical problems since it presupposed the conclusion of a multilateral agreement linked to the Treaty, while the Conference was not empowered to negotiate such an instrument.

The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones could play a positive role in the process of reducing military arsenals, from both the psychological and political points of view. However, given the great mobility and range of the vectors, the establishment of such zones did not necessarily offer absolute safeguards at the military level.

Although the information received indicated that the provisions of article I of the Treaty had not been violated, it must be acknowledged that new dangers were threatening the effectiveness of the current system. For the first time, States parties to the Treaty had reportedly attempted secretly to obtain equipment that could be used in the manufacture of nuclear weapons, which was all the more disturbing because one of the States in question had already employed other weapons of mass destruction, was in possession of missiles with a considerable range and had not hesitated to attack neighbouring countries. The proliferation of missiles, which was a new development, was therefore particularly dangerous in the case of States possessing weapons of mass destruction. Furthermore, the fact that certain parties to the Treaty had not concluded safeguards agreements with IAEA within the stipulated time was particularly alarming, especially when the States in question were using nuclear facilities that were not subject to control and making their signature conditional on demands for which the Treaty made no provision.

Her delegation welcomed the fact that three non-party States, namely, Argentina, Brazil and South Africa, had apparently abandoned any intention of pursuing their military nuclear programmes, and it hoped that those countries would rapidly become parties to the Treaty. It had the same hope with regard to Israel, India and Pakistan, whose uncontrolled nuclear facilities continued to be a source of very serious concern to the international community as a whole.

With regard to article III, paragraph 2, of the Treaty, the fact that even a depositary State had recenty delivered major nuclear facilities to a State that was not a party to the Treaty without requiring those facilities to be placed under the control of the Agency proved that unanimous agreement did not exist on the question of safeguards. A policy of refusal to deliver nuclear material or restrictions on its delivery might in certain cases lead the States concerned to take the path of uncontrolled autarky. Switzerland, for its part, had not recently had to take a decision on such a delivery to a

non-nuclear-weapon State that was not a party to the Treaty. However, if such a case were to arise, it might consider requiring all nuclear facilities in the receiving country to be placed under international safeguards.

The system of safeguards under IAEA control had proved to be effective for the past 20 years or so, but it seemed that the Agency, whose budget was also subject to the zero-growth principle, would not be able to cope with its increasingly heavy inspection work-load in future. Since few countries were prepared to increase their financial contribution to that sector of the Agency's activities, it might be useful to consider a different conception of the system itself, without calling into question the effectiveness and credibility of the non-proliferation régime. The Conference might look into that question of principle, while respecting the Agency's decision-making autonomy in that area.

Concerning article IV of the Treaty, she said that the Swiss Government intended to keep the nuclear option open so that Switzerland could have access to an adequate energy supply as well as for ecological reasons. Since the political, economic and social impact of the accident at the Chernobyl power station had raised doubts about the future of the nuclear option, international co-operation on the technological safety of nuclear facilities was more necessary than ever. In addition, since the costs of a new nuclear programme had become prohibitive for most of the developing countries, it had to be acknowledged that, for a large number of States, the exercise of the rights set forth in article IV remained theoretical.

The basic objectives of the Treaty had always given rise to animated discussion, namely, whether priority should be given to the elimination of nuclear weapons, the promotion of the development of nuclear energy in the countries of the third world or action to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. In her delegation's opinion, the Treaty, signed by each of the parties in the interest of a common cause, should be considered as a whole, the goal being to attain all the objectives it set forth. In the long term, however, purely technical measures such as the implementation of IAEA safeguards were not sufficient to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and all States would have to show all the political will necessary to work towards that goal. In fact, many States now openly recognized that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would threaten their own security and thus that it was in their own interest to respect the provisions of the Treaty.

Finally, in her delegation's opinion, it was not for the Fourth Review Conference to look into the question of extending the Treaty in 1995, for in conformity with article X of the Treaty, extension would be considered at a special conference to be held in 1995. The organization of that conference might be entrusted to a preparatory committee that could meet in 1993.

Mr. WALDEGRAVE (United Kingdom) noted that the Conference was taking place at a time when the divisions between East and West were dissolving, but when there were great tensions in other areas of the world, especially in the Gulf. The illegal annexation of Kuwait was putting the whole fabric of law to the test. In that connection, his delegation associated itself with the remarks made by the Italian delegation about the treatment of innocent civilians, including a large number of United Kingdom citizens.

Since 1986, the last four States that had signed but not ratified the Treaty had finally deposited their instruments of ratification, and five more States - Malawi, Spain, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Qatar - had acceded. His delegation also welcomed the fact that the two nuclear-weapon States that were not parties to the Treaty, China and France, were attending the Conference for the first time as observers.

The assurance which the Treaty gave enhanced the security of all the States parties and of the whole world, but the threat of poliferation remained very real, which was why all States should be called on to accede to the Treaty as the principal international instrument in that area. The Treaty also constituted an important foundation for the international system of safeguards operated by IAEA, which made possible the peaceful use of atomic energy, in conformity with article IV. In that connection his delegation did not believe that a distinction should be made between the Agency's promotional and safeguarding activities; it fully acknowledged the importance of the Agency's role in both areas. The United Kingdom, for its part, had steadily been increasing its contribution to the Agency's Technical Assistance and Co-operation Fund as well as its financial contribution to the projects specifically aimed at helping NPT developing member States.

Turning to the question of compliance with the obligations incumbent on States parties to the Treaty, he said that the nuclear-weapon States had a special obligation to ensure that they did not in any way, even inadvertently, contribute to the development of nuclear weapons by a non-nuclear-weapon State. In that connection, the United Kingdom continued to work together

with other nuclear supplier States to define exactly what was entailed by the obligations contained in article III and was scrupulous in complying with export regulations in that area.

He acknowledged that the United Kingdom did discriminate: in favour of parties to the Treaty and in favour of the peaceful use of nuclear energy. His country was prepared to join a consensus of other major suppliers to insist on full-scope safeguards as a condition of supply of nuclear exports to non-nuclear-weapon States.

Nuclear-weapon States were not required by the Treaty to accept safeguards on their civil nuclear activities. However, it was recognized that some safeguarding was desirable, and the Third Review Conference had recommended the universal application of IAEA safeguards to all peaceful nuclear activities. Although his delegation had some hesitation about the priority that should be given to that question, he wished to make it clear that the United Kingdom reported fully to IAEA on all civil nuclear material and authorized the Agency to designate for inspection any civil nuclear installation on the country's facilities list. All United Kingdom civil nuclear activities were inspected by EURATOM.

Concerning the implementation of article VI, he welcomed the progress made since 1985. East-West tensions had been reduced, and the threat of global nuclear war had receded. At the previous month's NATO summit meeting in London, the member States had proposed to the member States of the Warsaw Treaty Organization a joint declaration solemnly stating that they were no longer adversaries and reaffirming their intention to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State. With regard to nuclear disarmament, he congratulated the United States and the Soviet Union on the INF Treaty, which had come into force in 1988, and on the progress achieved in the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks. The two States had also reached agreement on verification protocols for the threshold test-ban Treaty and the peaceful nuclear explosions Treaty. The United Kingdom would respect the new régime for nuclear testing established by those Treaties, but it would have to continue to conduct underground tests to ensure that its nuclear weapons remained effective and safe. A comprehensive test-ban treaty remained a long-term goal. The number of land-based nuclear warheads in Europe had also declined significantly as a result of NATO's unilateral withdrawal of some 2,400 weapons since 1979.

The Alliance had agreed that, shortly after the signature of an agreement on the reduction of conventional forces in Europe, negotiations should begin between the United States and the Soviet Union on the reduction of short-range nuclear forces. The Alliance had also proposed that, once those negotiations had begun, they should eliminate all nuclear artillery shells in Europe in return for reciprocal action by the Soviet Union. That having been said, the ultimate objective of article VI was a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. There, too, some satisfactory results had been recorded. The period since 1985 had seen agreement on a series of far-reaching measures to promote confidence and stability in Europe and rapid progress towards the reduction of conventional forces, and there had been progress towards a global ban on the production, possession and use of chemical weapons. The United Kingdom had played an important role in the negotiations in those areas and would continue to do so, and it called on all the States represented at the Conference to join it in working to promote the further easing of tensions, the strengthening of trust and international peace and security.

Regarding the implementation of the Treaty by other States parties, he said his delegation was extremely concerned. It noted, first of all, that a considerable number of States parties to the Treaty had not fulfilled their obligation under article III, paragraph 4, to negotiate a safeguards agreement with IAEA. Some of those States had significant nuclear facilities on their territory. For example, North Korea had deposited its instrument of accession in December 1985 and had still not concluded a safeguards agreement. There were other States which had concluded safeguards agreements but whose behaviour gave cause for concern. There was also the question of clandestine procurement. Clandestine procurement of sensitive items inevitably aroused suspicions about the intentions of the States concerned. To combat such activities, exports of nuclear products must be monitored. Moreover, under article 73 of its Statute, the Agency could propose additional inspections, and under article 77 it could obtain access to information or locations in addition to that specified in the agreement. Finally, under article 19, if the Board of Governors found that the Agency was unable to verify that nuclear material was indeed being used for peaceful purposes, it could take a number of steps described in the Agency's Statute. Those provisions might be used if there were grounds for suspicion that any State party to the Treaty was accumulating unsafeguarded nuclear material.

If all States parties could pledge to comply with their obligations and guard against any actions that were contrary to the Treaty, they would be contributing to the maintenance and strengthening of the Treaty. As for States not parties to the Treaty, the United Kingdom urged them to accede to it. It addressed that call particularly to India and Pakistan, Israel and South Africa, Argentina and Brazil, all States that had significant unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. It also invited all the other non-parties to accede to the Treaty.

Finally, he asked delegations to keep two goals in mind: first, to concentrate on the real tasks of the Conference, and second, to send a signal to the world that the Treaty was in good sh[illegible] and that all the States parties supported its noble objectives.

Mr. LOEIS (Indonesia) said that the Fourth Review Conference of the parties to the NPT provided an opportunity for a sober assessment of the Treaty's implementation. His delegation hoped that the Conference, which was taking place in an atmosphere characterized by improved relations in various regions of the world and the progress made by the United States and the Soviet Union in the area of reduction of nuclear weapons, would become a landmark on the road to the total cessation of the nuclear arms race, horizontal as well as vertical. The Treaty would be credible only if its three cardinal principles, namely, the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament and the promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, were respected. His delegation hoped that the Review Conference would furnish an opportunity of enhancing that credibility.

Turning to an evaluation of the implementation of the Treaty, he said that the three nuclear-weapon States parties had observed the provisions of article I but had not been able fully to implement the provisions of the eighth to eleventh preambular paragraphs and article VI. Since the Treaty's entry into force, progress towards halting the nuclear arms race and vertical proliferation had been meagre. The non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, for their part, had fully discharged their obligations under article II. Indonesia believed that the factors that had led to the inability of States parties fully to implement the Treaty's provisions should be reviewed regularly to enhance its credibility. The United States and the Soviet Union had concluded agreements aimed at halting the arms race, but that was insufficient. His delegation was of the view that the most decisive

measure to halt the nuclear arms race was a total ban on nuclear testing. Moreover, under the provisions of article VI, all parties had undertaken to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and on nuclear disarmament, as well as on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. Thus the Treaty should not be considered merely as an instrument to encourage negotiations on nuclear and non-nuclear arms control. Indonesia was also worried by the fact that the reduction of the number of nuclear weapons was being accompanied by improvements in the quality, accuracy and reliability of nuclear weapon systems. With regard to nuclear disarmament, an assessment of the position also revealed a certain degree of dissatisfaction. It was true that the INF Treaty had initiated a reduction in nuclear arsenals. However, even a 30 per cent reduction of the strategic nuclear weaponry of the United States and the Soviet Union would still leave them with arsenals far exceeding those they had had in 1970, which was contrary to the spirit of article VI of the Treaty.

Turning to the implementation of article III, he noted with satisfaction that the IAEA safeguards system had effectively served the goal of preventing the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. However, the system had been operating under the principle of a "zero growth" budget, and Indonesia believed that that might jeopardize its effectiveness. It was only just that the contributions of the nuclear-weapon States or the most advanced nuclear States should continuously be increased and that the Agency should not use budgetary restrictions as a pretext to lessen safeguard coverage. The Government of Indonesia was also concerned by the growing demands of the heavily safeguarded industrial countries to limit the safeguards system operating in their nuclear facilities. Any relaxation of present standards would seriously erode the effectiveness of the system. Placing the civilian nuclear facilities of the nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States on an equal footing would certainly help to encourage transparency, which was a crucial element in the promotion of international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In that connection, during the mid-1980s nuclear-weapon States had voluntarily submitted their civilian nuclear facilities to the safeguards system. But that was insufficient: the system should be in operation in all civilian nuclear facilities and fuel cycles in all countries.

Since the last Review Conference, efforts had been made and concrete measures taken to implement article IV, and particularly paragraph 2. However, there was much more to be done if the developing countries parties to the Treaty were fully to enjoy all its benefits. It should be noted that, instead of facilitating the fullest exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for peaceful purposes, some States parties continued to give assistance in the nuclear field to States that were not parties, thus applying discriminatory policies against the non-nuclear-weapon developing States parties to the Treaty. The implementation of article IV in the last few years had been affected to a great extent by the world-wide slow-down in the growth of civilian nuclear power owing to environmental, safety and economic factors. In addition, after a series of serious nuclear accidents, efforts had been made to maximize safety in nuclear power plants. Since the cost of modern nuclear power plants with new safety features was very high, many developing countries encountered problems in financing them. For that reason, he fully supported the statement made by the representative of the non-aligned and neutral States which called upon States parties that were in a position to do so to expand their assistance through IAEA and to promote favourable financing by international institutions for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Regarding the implementation of article VII, Indonesia had always emphasized the importance of the regional approach to peace and security, in particular through the establishment of zones of peace or nuclear-weapon-free zones. The Indonesian Government believed that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various regions, based on decisions freely arrived at by the States of the region, would promote peace, stability and security in the areas concerned and curb the spread of nuclear weapons. At their summit meeting in December 1987, the ASEAN States had emphasized that ASEAN should intensify its efforts aimed at the early establishment of south-east Asian nuclear-weapon-free zone. Despite the strong determination of the countries in the region, the ASEAN nations had encountered insurmountable obstacles. His delegation therefore repeated its earnest call to all parties to support the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South-East Asia.

The question of strengthening the security of the non-nuclear-weapon States that had undertaken to renounce nuclear weapons had always been one of the central issues in the debates on non-proliferation. The resolution adopted by the United Nations General Assembly at its forty-fourth session also indicated the urgency of having an international instrument to protect non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Indonesia was convinced that the most effective way to protect the non-nuclear-weapon States was the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Pending nuclear disarmament, all nuclear-weapon States should give an unconditional guarantee not to use, or threaten to use, nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States. Negative security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States were one of the incentives nuclear-weapon States could provide in exchange for the commitment of non-nuclear-weapon States not to produce, acquire or possess nuclear weapons. Indonesia supported a number of concrete proposals tabled during the preparations for the Conference.

The Fourth Review Conference was a crucial one. In view of the 1995 Conference, it could not afford to fail. It should therefore reaffirm the need to enhance the effectiveness of the Treaty, and the parties should reaffirm their commitment to its purposes; but that was not sufficient. The Conference must spell out the measures to be taken, particularly by the parties that had not implemented the provisions of the Treaty. Indonesia would continue to demand a comprehensive test ban, nuclear disarmament and assurances that nuclear weapons would not be used or held out as threats against non-nuclear countries. Indonesia also requested that the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty should be accorded greater assistance in the development of their programmes for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Mr. GENSCHER (Federal Republic of Germany) said it was gratifying that representatives of the international community were gathered at Geneva for the fourth time to review the 1968 NPT. The fact that the number of participating countries, member States and observers had grown was a sign of the continuing confidence in the Treaty. The NPT had proved to be a corner-stone of international stability and had performed its function of fostering international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, proving that the peaceful uses of nuclear energy were fully compatible with the goal of non-proliferation. In that connection, the European Council, meeting at Dublin, and the economic summit at Houston had emphasized the need

to make every effort to contribute to strengthening non-proliferation and encouraging the participation of further countries. The Federal Republic of Germany, for its part, had expressed its unconditional support for all initiatives aimed at preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. It had undertaken to contribute actively to the successful outcome of the Fourth Review Conference and had appealed to all countries to make joint efforts to avert the danger of nuclear weapons proliferation.

Considerable progress had been made in the five years since the last Review Conference in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and disarmament. A new political setting had emerged in recent years, characterized by the following: Europe was at a turning-point in history; the elimination of ideological confrontation had paved the way for eliminating military confrontation and reducing military arsenals; parallel to reductions of armaments, new co-operative security structures were emerging; and German unification was proving to be a pace-maker for the coalescence of Europe. Democracy and a social market economy, co-operation and an awareness of interdependence characterized the new Europe as it headed for a pan-European peaceful order.

The NPT was a central instrument for the maintenance of international peace, and the Federal Republic of Germany therefore advocated the long-term extension of the Treaty beyond 1995. It had consistently pursued an effective policy of non-proliferation and the comprehensive renunciation of weapons of mass destruction. Thus it had renounced nuclear weapons on acceding to the Western European Union in 1954, introduced a system of extensive controls for the use of nuclear energy in the European Atomic Energy Community founded in 1957, joined the International Atomic Energy Agency in 1957 and acceded to the NPT in 1975, thus confirming at a global level its renunciation of nuclear weapons.

The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany strongly supported the IAEA safeguards system and made every effort to increase their effectiveness. Strict compliance with the international nuclear suppliers group guidelines was an essential element of German non-proliferation policy. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany had adopted more stringent foreign trade regulations to strengthen the non-proliferation régime and encourage international co-operation in the civilian use of nuclear energy. Above all, i at meant that exports of nuclear goods to non-NPT countries would in principle be authorized only if those countries subjected all source and

special fissionable materials to IAEA full-scope safeguards. In addition, it had been decided to codify principles of German nuclear export policy that were already being observed. Efforts to prevent the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction must not overlook missile technology. The Federal Government strongly supported all activities designed to make the missile technology control régime established in 1987 more effective. It called upon all countries to do the same.

The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany took export controls very seriously, despite the fact that military exports had accounted for only 0.2 per cent of the Federal Republic's total exports in 1989, and it had adopted some very severe and restrictive export control measures to avert the danger of proliferation of militarily-usable technology and to prevent illegal arms exports. However, the best contribution to nulcear non-proliferation was accession by all countries to the NPT, and the Federal Republic therefore appealed once more to all countries that had not yet done so to accede to the Treaty.

He welcomed regional efforts to prevent the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Such efforts were an important contribution to maintaining regional stability - the Tlatelolco Treaty being a good example.

As long as the nuclear-weapon States had not fulfilled their obligations under the Treaty, the demands of the non-nuclear-weapon States for guarantees against the use or the threat of use of nuclear weapons remained legitimate. The strengthening of negative security assurances could have a positive impact on the universality of the Treaty.

The NPT was not intended merely to prevent an increase in the number of nuclear-weapon States. It combined the peaceful uses of nuclear energy with the commitment to disarmament and arms control. Since its accession to the Treaty, the Federal Republic of Germany had emphasized the commitment to nuclear disarmament contained in article VI, and it had strengthened its commitment since the last Review Conference. It had accordingly played a significant part in bringing about the INF Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union, which provided for the world-wide elimination of an entire category of weapons, and it had strongly supported the START negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union, which aimed at reducing their strategic nuclear weapon systems. It welcomed the negotiations on confidence-building and security measures and the Geneva negotiations on defensive and space weapons.

Further nuclear disarmament was necessary and indeed possible. The changed security situation in Europe would permit less and less reliance on nuclear weapons for the purpose of preventing war. In that connection, he mentioned the negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union on the reduction of short-range nuclear weapons, which would be started soon after the signing of an agreement on conventional forces in Europe. The signing of the verification protocols to the threshold Treaties at the United States-Soviet summit in Washington would constitute a further stage along the road to a ban on nuclear tests.

The Federal Republic of Germany advocated agreement on an effectively verifiable nuclear test ban as soon as possible within the framework of the Geneva Conference on Disarmament. It also advocated a step-by-step approach to that goal, like that taken by the United States and the Soviet Union in their negotiations on nuclear test matters. As a non-nuclear-weapon State, the Federal Republic of Germany focused on developing, together with other countries, reliable verification procedures for nuclear explosions. It welcomed the re-establishment of the Ad hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament. The Conference to amend the partial test-ban Treaty, scheduled for January 1991, reflected the serious endeavour of many countries to achieve faster progress on that question.

The NPT applied not only to nuclear disarmament but to all kinds of weapons. All military equipment must be reduced. That was the goal of the arms control negotiations taking place in Vienna. The negotiations on conventional forces in Europe were aimed at establishing a secure and stable balance of conventional forces at lower levels and at eliminating the capability for launching surprise attacks and initiating large-scale offensive action. That goal, which was now within reach, would establish a qualitatively new basis for peace and security in Europe by the end of 1990 and oblige participating countries to destroy thousands of tanks, artillery pieces and other military equipment.

The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany regarded the reallocation of arms resources to peaceful purposes as a major new international challenge. That question had recently been the subject of a United Nations Conference in Moscow. The aim was to limit the arms production potential and at the same time to create capacity for industrial development that would benefit all countries.

Further progress in arms control was needed, not only in Europe but also world-wide, and weapons exports to third world countries should be reduced. The third world must not become a dump for weapons no longer needed in Europe. The proliferation of chemical weapons in those countries would be particularly tragic. The conclusion of a world-wide, comprehensive and verifiable ban on chemical weapons was long overdue. Only a convention of that nature, containing effective verification rules, could reliably and lastingly prevent the spread of such weapons. The events of the past few weeks had made it clear that there was an urgent need for world-wide agreement on a comprehensive chemical weapons ban, as solemly reaffirmed by the vast majority of the international community at the Paris Conference in January 1989. The United States and the Soviet Union had already reached an agreement to stop the production of chemical weapons. Like its Western partners, the Federal Republic of Germany had stated that it intended to be one of the original signatories of the world-wide chemical weapons convention and appealed to all countries to do the same.

The international community was experiencing a period of new opportunities and new challenges, for the East-West conflict was now a thing of the past. The new development of the relationship between the two super-Powers made the peace-keeping missions of the United Nations ever more effective, as illustrated by the successful efforts made in southern Africa and Central America. However, the positive changes in Europe and other regions did not automatically lead to world peace. Iraq's aggression had confronted the world and hence the United Nations with a new crucial test. The United Nations had demonstrated its firmness on that question by adopting various resolutions which very clearly indicated that Iraq's invasion of Kuwait constituted a breach of international peace and security. Iraq must withdraw its forces immediately and unconditionally. As long as it refused to do so, it was essential for all countries jointly to implement the economic sanctions adopted by the Security Council in its resolution 661. Every effort must be made to contribute to a peaceful solution on the basis of the Security Council resolutions.

More than ever before the world must seek peaceful solutions to its conflicts. The Charter of the United Nations and the institution of confidence-building measures were essential components of the peace process.

Soon there would be only one German State. That development illustrated the end of the cold war and of the antagonism and political rivalry that had divided East and West for over 40 years. After the achievement of unity, the German nation would face the task of eliminating the consequences of long-standing divisions in the political, economic and social spheres. But unification would also stimulate the united Germany to devote even greater efforts to global problems whose solution no longer brooked any delay. It would also make every effort to achieve the unity of Europe as a whole.

The united Germany's commitment to deep cuts in its forces would serve as an example of how swords were turned into ploughshares. Disarmament and arms control policy would be a central element of the peace policy pursued by a united Germany. In that spirit, the Governments of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic had decided to make a joint declaration before the representatives of the international community.

The two Governments reaffirmed their contractual and unilateral undertaking not to manufacture, possess or have control over nuclear, biological or chemical weapons. They declared that the united Germany, too, would abide by that obligation. Rights and obligations under the instruments of the NPT would continue to apply to the United Germany, which would seek the continued validity of the Treaty beyond 1995. At the Geneva Conference on Disarmament, the united Germany would strive for a comprehensive, world-wide and verifiable ban on chemical weapons at the earliest possible date, and it intended to be one of the original signatories of the convention.

The international community was at a particularly critical but promising threshold in the final decade of the second millennium. It must be crossed jointly with a firm dedication to peaceful co-operation and international solidarity. The participants in the Conference were called upon to conduct joint efforts to enhance the authority and effectiveness of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Mr. DOMKE (German Democratic Republic) referred to the joint declaration of the Governments of the two German States on the renunciation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons which showed that the two Governments were agreed that the united Germany would act in a constructive spirit for comprehensive disarmament and for the promotion of international peace. It would be appropriate for those principles of renunciation to become embodied in the future Constitution of the united Germany, and he noted that the recent

talks between President Gorbachev and Federal Chancellor Kohl had reaffirmed the hope that a nuclear-weapon-free territory would emerge in the very place where the highest density of nuclear weapons was still to be found.

The recent changes in the German Democratic Republic, German unification and the democratization of Eastern Europe had paved the way for pan-European security and co-operation structures. The positive developments that had taken place in Europe and in the relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States offered an unprecedented opportunity to reduce nuclear arsenals and to meet the obligations incumbent on States possessing nuclear weapons under article VI of the NPT. That would make peace more secure and considerably strengthen the non-proliferation régime for nuclear weapons.

The events taking place in the Middle East showed how fragile peace was. It would take efforts on all sides to settle that conflict, which illustrated once again the crucial importance of the NPT. In that context, there was an urgent need for the world-wide prohibition of chemical weapons.

The NPT made an important contribution to both universal and regional security. It promoted both international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and nuclear arms limitation and disarmament. Although non-proliferation had come to be an established norm of international law, the Treaty was by no means perfect. However, he appealed to all delegations to leave aside the Treaty's weaknesses to seek consensus on preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. It was encouraging to note that further States had acceded to the Treaty since the Third Review Conference and that China and France were attending the Conference as observers. He hoped that those and other States would consider acceding to the Treaty.

Looking back over the period under review, he said that the basic commitments contained in articles I and II of the Treaty had been observed. But times had changed and there was a need to strengthen existing international rules against the proliferation of those weapons. Efforts must be made to prevent the spread of ballistic means of delivery and of certain components for the manufacture of nuclear weapons.

While the non-proliferation régime could hinder the proliferation of nuclear weapons, in the long run the question could be solved only by political means, by the cessation of the nuclear arms race and by nuclear disarmament. That relationship was reflected in article VI of the NPT and had

also inspired the joint non-proliferation statement made by Presidents Bush and Gorbachev at their Washington summit. The implementation of the INF Treaty, the envisaged signing of a START agreement between the United States and the USSR by the end of the year, and the beginning of negotiations on tactical nuclear weapons were the next steps in the nuclear disarmament process. No nuclear-weapon State should remain aloof from that process.

A comprehensive nuclear test ban remained a matter of priority. The progress recently achieved in Soviet-American negotiations should be continued by further bilateral measures to reduce such tests quickly in number and yield. The re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Geneva Conference on Disarmament was a positive step. The Conference to amend the Moscow partial test-ban Treaty of 1963 was an expression of the world-wide interest in the early cessation of all test explosions.

Regional measures such as nuclear-weapon-free zones effectively complemented the NPT. The Treaties of Tlatelolco and Rarotonga should therefore be followed by further agreements establishing such zones. The non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty rightly expected guarantees of their security. Renunciation of the use of nuclear weapons would enhance the security of those States. Major steps in that direction had been the unilateral statements of the USSR and China on the non-first use of nuclear weapons. The current review of the security concepts of the nuclear-weapon States and of the alliances opened up new prospects in that area.

The IAEA safeguards system was an essential guarantee for ensuring the effectiveness of the Treaty. The IAEA's inspectorate was making an important contribution to the effective implementation of the NPT. Modern nuclear technologies made novel demands on safeguards. The German Democratic Republic was certain that the future Germany would support IAEA in the further development of its safeguards system. What was also needed was the conclusion of safeguards agreements between IAEA and the States parties to the NPT, in particular those with significant nuclear activities.

The experience gathered from the well-functioning system of verification constituted by IAEA safeguards should be taken into account in future arms limitation and disarmament accords, especially regarding the cessation of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes. The German Democratic Republic supported the proposal to separate military from civilian

nuclear activities in the nuclear-weapon States. In that connection, measures to control the export of nuclear materials, equipment and technologies continued to be of great importance. The German Democratic Republic endorsed the decisions recently taken by the Governments of the Federal Republic of Germany and Japan.

The NPT and its safeguards system had created the necessary basis of trust for international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. IAEA, which had proved its competence, should continue to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in developing countries through its Technical Assistance and Co-operation Programme.

The German Democratic Republic, which had learned the lessons of Chernobyl, was convinced of the need for the renunciation of nuclear energy as the primary source of energy in the long-term future, and it used nuclear energy to produce only 10 per cent of the electric power it needed. The bulk of its energy was derived from lignite processing with all its ecologically harmful consequences. The 5.2 million tonnes of sulphur dioxide and 2.2 million tonnes of dust discharged into the atmosphere in his country annually explained why nuclear energy, in the short and medium term, would remain part and parcel of German energy policy until it was possible to reduce the environmentally harmful effects of conventional electric power generation. In the area of nuclear energy use, top priority was given to nuclear safety and radiation protection. The Government of the German Democratic Republic, supported by the Federal Republic and with the services of Soviet and French experts, had submitted all its power reactors in operation or under construction to a thorough safety evaluation, which had resulted in the shutting-down of some nuclear power reactors.

In conclusion, he recalled that, in the weeks to come, the Conference would have to set the course for the extension of the NPT in 1995. That would require co-operation from all sides, as Egypt had suggested in its proposal on an international dialogue on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Conference would best live up to the expectations placed in it if it adopted a comprehensive final document calling, in particular, for further nuclear arms limitation and disarmament measures, achieving the universality of the NPT, promoting international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and strengthening the IAEA safeguards system. The Conference should not merely strengthen the Treaty but also make an important contribution to world-wide security.

Mr. PERPINA-ROBERT (Spain) said that the Conference was opening at a time when mankind, which had begun to believe in a new and hopeful way in peace, freedom and common ideals in many countries, had been harshly brought back to reality. Facing the spectre of war, injustice and violence, Spain wished to make a new appeal in favour of peace and international legality on the basis of strict compliance with recent Security Council resolutions on the current crisis. In that context, he associated himself with the statement made at the previous meeting by the Under-Secretary of State of Italy.

In becoming a signatory of the NPT on 5 November 1987, Spain had encapsuled in a legal framework the strict policy of nuclear non-proliferation that its Government, aware of its own security requirements and of the changes needed to ensure collective security in the world, had applied until then. A climate of trust among States must be created through the reformulation of doctrines and military strategies in order for them not to have war as their goal, but the avoidance of war. Coherent disarmament processes endowed with adequate verification mechanisms would allow for the creation of balances of forces at lower levels, on an unrelinquishable security threshold. The benefits of disarmament would be reflected in development and people's welfare, by which the disarmament-development-security trilogy would acquire its full significance.

Spain's current non-proliferation policy remained based on the NPT, which it continued to consider not as a point of arrival but as a corner-stone on which a safer world could be built, based on confidence, co-operation and mutual respect among all States, as Spain had declared on acceding to the Treaty.

At a time when the countries of Central and Eastern Europe were making rapid progress towards freedom and democracy, which would lead to the strengthening of peace and security, nuclear non-proliferation was a challenge to be met by all mankind. The gradual disappearance of East-West tensions had opened up new prospects for the nuclear non-proliferation policy and for disarmament.

The NPT was an essential instrument for achieving two indissociable objectives: the control of nuclear proliferation and the promotion of international co-operation. With regard to limiting the proliferation of nuclear weapons, national measures, whether bilateral or multilateral, of a technical, commercial or even military nature, were no substitute for the willing consent given by potential donors and recipients of nuclear

technology, based on the conviction that the proliferation and multiplication of nuclear weapons did not contribute to national security but had the opposite effect. For Spain, however, the promotion of international co-operation and technology transfer for peaceful uses of nuclear energy was just as vital in order for the Treaty to attain the necessary credibility and to be universally applied.

A system should be conceived at the Conference, as well as in other United Nations bodies, that respected countries' legitimate interests, so that those who so wished might have access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.

Although it was not perfect, the NPT had served to achieve the purposes for which it had been devised. It should be mentioned that at the previous Review Conference, in 1985, 132 countries had renewed their support for the Treaty, thereby strengthening it politically. Since then, the accession of nine new member States, including Spain, had underscored its vitality and universal nature.

Although observance of the Treaty since 1985 could be deemed satisfactory, there were still important areas in which improvements must be made. In the past few years, and very recently, there had been serious cause for concern in territories where tensions had increased. Strict compliance with the safeguards provided for under article III of the Treaty was more necessary than ever, together with the signing by those States which had not yet done so of safeguard agreements with IAEA, as they had undertaken to do when they had entered into the Treaty.

In that connection, IAEA with its safeguards system was a major factor for non-proliferation and must play a leading role in promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. At the same time, Spain attached enormous importance to IAEA's activities in the field of technical co-operation for peaceful purposes. Its role must therefore be strengthened and its efforts given maximum support by all countries.

The observance of articles IV and V of the Treaty was vital in order to attract new signatories and to strengthen the NPT's credibility with a view to extending it in 1995.

Spain also attached great importance to compliance with the provisions of article VI of the Treaty which was intended to put an end to the arms race and to advance towards nuclear disarmament. In that connection the Government of Spain welcomed the conclusion of the INF Treaty which for the first time in

history eliminated an entire category of nuclear weapons, and it unreservedly supported the rapid conclusion of a START treaty, which would provide for the elimination of 50 per cent of the super-Powers' strategic nuclear weapons, as well as the agreement in principle recently concluded by the United States and the Soviet Union in that respect. He was convinced that the conclusion and implementation of the INF Treaty, the advances in the negotiations on strategic nuclear weapons and prospects for immediate negotiations on short-range nuclear weapons based in Europe would have a considerable impact on the work of the Conference.

Nuclear testing should gradually be reduced, with a view, when the time came, to achieving the total elimination of nuclear weapons, which were weapons of mass destruction par excellence. The international community appeared to be willing to move in that direction. The best ally of the disarmament process was a realistic, and therefore gradual, approach. If the necessary joint efforts were made to reduce nuclear weapons until they had been completely eliminated, a total ban on nuclear testing would be achieved as a matter of course. In that way transformation of the partial test-ban Treaty, which was a legitimate cause of concern for many countries, would be carried out.

Another pillar of Spain's non-proliferation policy was control of the technology likely to be used for the manufacture of missiles, especially those that could be fitted with nuclear warheads.

Recent regional conflicts that had taken place in different areas of the world, and the use in some cases of weapons of mass destruction with indiscriminate effects, had shown the need for the international community to take steps to prevent such things from happening again. Co-operating with a group of countries that had also expressed concern at the proliferation of missiles with multiple capacities, Spain had in 1989 joined the Missile Technology Control Régime (MTCR) set up in 1987 by the United States, France, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan and Canada. The régime, which did not hamper technology transfer for peaceful uses, was an irreplaceable instrument for preventing the proliferation of missiles. The Government of Spain was satisfied with the operation of those control mechanisms and hoped that a growing number of countries would join; in its view the MTCR was an adequate instrument for completing a rigorous nuclear non-proliferation policy.

Discussions would also focus on the problem of the renewal of the Treaty, which would be decided at the 1995 Conference. Neither article X nor any weighty reason whatsoever militated in favour of ending the NPT. In five years, when the States parties were called upon to decide how to extend the Treaty, a fresh review of the status of nuclear proliferation would probably reveal compelling reasons to extend an instrument whose usefulness had been amply demonstrated. A large number of organizational aspects would have to be taken into consideration at the present Conference and up to 1995, but that should be done without casting any doubt on the need for maintaining the Treaty in force. For the Government of Spain, 1995 would be the year not of the Treaty's expiry, but of its extension by the Conference for an indefinite period or for the longest possible period.

The survival of mankind depended on the rational use of the new force represented by nuclear energy, and its possible non-peaceful use was a grave concern for which the international community must find an adequate solution. The continuation of nuclear disarmament, improvement of the Treaty control mechanisms and safeguards and better systems of transfer and co-operation for the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes were reasons for which the Spanish Government would like to see the NPT not only maintained, but also strengthened and enlarged. The accession of new parties with a view to making the Treaty universal would be desirable. His delegation, for its part, would spare no effort to ensure the success of the Fourth Review Conference, which would also mean success for all peace-loving countries.

Mr. KOSIN (Yugoslavia), speaking on behalf of the non-aligned and other States parties to the NPT not taking part in the East European or Western groups, said that the NPT was a legally binding multilateral instrument that had confirmed the urgency of putting an end to the nuclear arms race. Its full implementation was an important step towards nuclear disarmament, world peace and regional security. Yet implementation was not an end in itself, since the aim of the Treaty was also to achieve general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. The number of signatory countries had increased significantly since the Treaty's entry into force, and the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty had established an international norm of non-acquisition and non-possession of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices by fulfilling their obligations under the Treaty.

Recent political developments further underscored the importance of strict and faithful compliance with the NPT in its entirety. It had become evident that the enhancement of peace and international security could be achieved by political means and through the widest possible international co-operation in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. Attempts to justify nuclear deterrence and the nuclear arms race ran contrary to those positive developments and the spirit of the NPT.

Although they recognized the positive elements and effects brought about by recent agreements and ongoing negotiations in the nuclear disarmament field, the countries he represented regretted that the modernization and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons continued. Vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons by nuclear-weapon States continued contrary to the provisions of the preamble and the articles of the Treaty. As for horizontal proliferation, the spread of nuclear weapons capability among certain States not parties to the NPT posed a serious threat to the non-proliferation régime and underlined the gravity of the problem.

In the circumstances, the non-aligned and other States parties underlined the importance of the basic goals of and the commitments undertaken under the NPT towards general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, namely, to avert the danger of nuclear war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples; to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race by taking effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament, and hence to achieve the discontinuance of all nuclear testing for all time by undertaking negotiations to that end without further delay; to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and, finally, to further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States, in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and their vectors.

The possibility of a significant extension of the NPT would be enhanced by the effective implementation of the Treaty by 1995 and in particular that of the obligations relating to nuclear disarmament. Consequently, it was urgent to take the necessary steps to consolidate the effectiveness of the NPT by reaffirming its authority, and to ensure its universality and the

implementation of its provisions, especially by the depository States. Such steps included instituting an immediate moratorium on all nuclear testing, as a provisional measure pending the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty; fully supporting the PTBT amendment Conference and undertaking full-scope negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty in the Ad Hoc Committee established in 1990 by the Conference on Disarmament; starting negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on items 2 and 3 of its agenda with the active participation of all nuclear-weapon States; declaring an immediate moratorium on and an immediate cessation of production of weapons-grade fissionable material and, finally, beginning immediate negotiations within the context of the NPT with a view to the early conclusion of a legally binding multilateral instrument of guarantees to non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. At the same time, negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament should be intensified with a view to concluding an international convention to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. In addition, the deployment of nuclear weapons in the non-nuclear-weapon States should be stopped and the nuclear weapons already deployed there withdrawn, existing agreements on nuclear-weapon-free zones should be respected and regional efforts aimed at establishing such zones supported; negotiations with a view to the further reduction and elimination of all types of nuclear weapons and their vectors should be intensified, with the participation of all nuclear-weapon States; the arms race in outer space should be prevented and immediate negotiations undertaken to that end and the commitment not to supply with nuclear-weapons-related material, technology and services the States not parties to the Treaty which had nuclear facilities not safeguarded by IAEA should be strictly respected.

For the non-aligned and other States parties to the Treaty, peaceful nuclear co-operation including technology transfer was a commitment laid down in article IV of the NPT, and they regretted the unsatisfactory realization of that commitment and the many unjustified restrictions and constraints imposed on developing non-nuclear-weapon States parties. They believed that those States parties that were in a position to do so should promote co-operation between States parties in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy; reaffirm their acceptance that all States parties were entitled to participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific information and to contribute to the further

development of applications of atomic energy for peaceful purposes; facilitate the fullest possible exchange of equipment, material and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy with the right of all States parties to participate in it; enhance the role of IAEA and provide better assistance through IAEA to developing countries, and favourable financing by international institutions to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and other nuclear technology applications. The States parties to the NPT should also provide adequate IAEA funding for both its assistance and safeguards functions. In addition, they should offer economic incentives to the developing countries parties to the NPT, not only in respect of nuclear energy but also other energy sources and accord special attention to the least developed countries. Finally, they should give priority to the NPT member developing countries in nuclear energy applications to food and agriculture, health, industry, physical and chemical sciences, nuclear safety, etc.

Non-proliferation measures should not jeopardize the full exercise of the inalienable right of all States parties to apply their programmes for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for economic and social development, in conformity with their priorities, interests and needs.

Finally, the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty should have access to and be free to acquire technology, equipment and materials for peaceful uses of nuclear energy, taking into account the particular needs of the developing countries.

Mr. MADHOUR (Iraq), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that the representative of the United Kingdom had referred to the illegal annexation of Kuwait and certain aspects of the Gulf crisis. However, reflection on the events of recent days or even those of the past century led to the conclusion that the problems raised in the Gulf, as in other regions, were the result of British colonialism. The peoples that had suffered from it in the past were aware of the nature of the relations that the United Kingdom had allowed to persist in the colonial countries after having been forced to leave them when they became liberated. The United Kingdom's colonial history in Kuwait and its establishment of dispersed entities whose purpose was to continue to divide the region were primarily responsible for that situation. The United Kingdom was not a policeman responsible for restoring order and enforcing international law, which it persisted in violating daily by its

military presence in the Gulf. The embargo that had been imposed to starve the populations of those countries was in itself a breach of international law. The Gulf problem could only be solved after the withdrawal of United Kingdom and other foreign forces from the region; that course of action offered the sole possibility of a peaceful settlement of the crisis in those countries.

He also reminded the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany that the Security Council resolutions in question had been adopted under Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations and that their implementation in no way required the use of armed force. The military measures that had been taken had absolutely no justification under international law.

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.

PROVISIONAL
For participants only

NPT/CONF.IV/SR.5
30 August 1990

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FOURTH REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

PROVISIONAL SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 5TH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Wednesday, 22 August 1990, at 3 p.m.

President: Mr. de RIVERO (Peru)

later: Ms. MASON (Canada)

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Request by Oman for observer status

General debate (continued)

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The meeting was called to order at 3.30 p.m.

REQUEST BY OMAN FOR OBSERVER STATUS

The PRESIDENT said that the Secretary-General of the Conference had received a request by Oman for observer status. If there was no objection, he would take it that the Conference decided to grant the request.

It was so decided.

GENERAL DEBATE (agenda item 12) (continued)

Mr. KORSGAARD-PEDERSEN (Denmark) said that, with its world-wide support and more than 140 States Parties, the NPT was the most successful multilateral agreement in the disarmament and arms limitation field. It had a unique position in the matter of nuclear arms control, because its subject was the nuclear weapon itself and because it covered not only East and West but also North and South aspects. It was, however, a matter for concern that some nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-weapon-capable States continued to remain outside the NPT. His delegation urged them to accede to it as soon as possible in order to make it a fully global treaty.

The NPT had been successful in fulfilling its primary goal of non-proliferation. Since its entry into force, no non-nuclear-weapon State Party had changed status with regard to nuclear weapons. At the same time, the possibility that some non-nuclear-weapons States had acquired, or were trying to acquire, nuclear weapon capabilities posed a threat to the non-proliferation régime and, together with the spread of missile technology, a potential danger to international peace and security.

His delegation had hoped that the Conference would meet in an international climate characterized by a high degree of optimism, brought about by the very positive developments in East-West relations. Recent developments elsewhere, however, had cast a deep shadow over the world political situation. He hoped that the Conference could nevertheless be conducted in a constructive atmosphere and that its outcome would make an important contribution to achieving the NPT's three main goals: to avert the spread of nuclear weapons, to limit and reduce nuclear weapons, and to promote international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

There had been promising developments in the negotiations on nuclear disarmament called for under article VI of the NPT. Remarkable progress had been achieved in the bilateral disarmament negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union with the conclusion of the INF treaty and the declared intention of both States to conclude a START treaty on the

reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms - a development very much in the spirit of the NPT. Those important first steps should be followed by further substantial cuts in the nuclear arsenals, with the ultimate aim of completely eliminating nuclear weapons. Again, the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test ban treaty would be a very effective measure in support of the purposes of the NPT and would make it more attractive for non-Parties to accede to it. Denmark had consistently supported the early conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test ban on all nuclear tests in all environments by all States and for all time. The Conference on Disarmament was the appropriate forum for multilateral negotiations on that issue and he welcomed the agreement it had reached on a mandate for the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban. Another multilateral effort in the same field was the convening in January 1991 of an Amendment Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water.

In the bilateral negotiations on nuclear testing between the United States and the Soviet Union, the agreement on the verification of the Threshold Test-Ban Treaty and on the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty had expanded the area of verification procedures. He urged the two parties to continue their negotiations aiming at substantial constraints on nuclear testing, with the final objective of a comprehensive test ban. The establishment of regional nuclear-weapon-free zones also helped to strengthen the concept of non-proliferation, and another very important measure would be effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

The NPT had formed the basis for international nuclear trade as well as international co-operation in peaceful uses of atomic energy under the IAEA. The IAEA full-scope safeguards system was a crucial element in the non-proliferation régime and his delegation would urge all States which had not yet done so to place their nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards. The obligation for Parties to the NPT to conclude a safeguards agreement under article III was unequivocal. The final objective must be that all civil nuclear facilities in the world should become subject to the IAEA safeguards. In view of the progress in nuclear technology and the substantial increase in nuclear material on a world-wide basis, the continued effectiveness and credibility of the IAEA safeguards had to be ensured.

The strong commitment of the five Nordic countries to further strengthening the non-proliferation régime had been reflected in a number of initiatives during the years in relation to the NPT. A memorandum stating their views had been issued as an official document of the Conference (NPT/CONF.IV/18). Moreover, earlier in 1990, the Nordic Governments had approached all non-NPT Parties appealing to the Governments concerned to accede to the NPT without delay. In a declaration issued in June 1990 by the European Council, the Member States of the European Community had stressed the great importance they attached to the maintenance of an effective international nuclear non-proliferation régime and their determination to work actively to secure a successful outcome for the present Review Conference.

Since the NPT helped to assure the security of all nations, both Parties and non-Parties, the world was a safer place. It was therefore vital for the Treaty to remain in force and for the 1995 Conference to decide that it should continue to be operative indefinitely. A positive outcome to the present Review Conference would further strengthen the NPT up to 1995 when the crucial decision would be made.

The Conference should strive to make a complete and balanced review of the implementation of the NPT over the past five years. It should also consider means to further strengthen the non-proliferation régime and the implementation of the NPT. Above all, it should reaffirm the support of the Parties for the NPT and stress the contribution it made to international and regional security and stability. The goal should be to produce a final document that was constructive and offered a relevant and significant contribution to future international nuclear non-proliferation efforts within the framework of the NPT.

Mr. WAGENMAKERS (Netherlands) said that seldom had the world begun a year in such a hopeful mood as in 1990, but equally seldom had the dangers been more apparent as the result of regional conflict. Advances in democracy, human rights and arms control were not limited to Europe but were also visible elsewhere. A world free of aggression and violence was coming a step closer, but the events of the past few weeks had shown how remote that goal was and, at the same time, how well the Charter of the United Nations could work when political unanimity in the Security Council was sustained.

The aim of the Parties to the NPT was to avert the danger of a nuclear war as a result of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The NPT had been the result of a growing awareness that the greater the number of countries

possessing nuclear weapons, the greater the risk of those weapons being used. There could be no doubt that regional conflicts would become far more serious if the non-proliferation policy was less scrupulously followed. The NPT had effectively promoted international stability and thereby fulfilled one of its principal objectives.

The NPT had also been of crucial importance as the major post-war multilateral arms control agreement. It had strengthened the belief that the spread of nuclear weapons could not be allowed to go unchecked. The preamble noted the intention of the Parties "to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race" and article VI reflected that same undertaking. In the past five years considerable progress had been made in the field of arms control and more tangible results could be expected in the near future. Important agreements had been reached by the United States and the Soviet Union on major outstanding issues in that connection. There had also been considerable advances in regional and world-wide disarmament over the past five years and the negotiations in Vienna on conventional stability in Europe could be expected to lead to an agreement within a few months. The discussions on a treaty on chemical weapons had reached an advanced stage. General and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, one of the aims of the NPT, still seemed rather remote, but there was some indication of movement in the right direction. After years of stagnation, some progress had been achieved on the subject of nuclear-weapon testing and discussion on that item had been resumed in the Conference on Disarmament. It was important that the number and yield of nuclear tests should be reduced to a minimum level, thereby offering the prospect of a comprehensive test ban at the appropriate moment.

Together with Hungary and Sweden, the Netherlands had submitted a working paper on the subject of a "Prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities" (NPT/CONF.IV/22), in the hope that it would lead to enhanced awareness of the issue in question. That awareness should be expressed in the final document of the present Review Conference.

While arms control served the security of the Parties well, the issue could be looked at in a broader context. A few years previously, nuclear-weapon States had issued assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Those welcome assurances were still valid. The discussion on security assurances towards

non-nuclear-weapon States would certainly be influenced by the recent political and military developments. His country supported efforts to arrive at appropriate effective international arrangements on that matter.

His delegation looked forward to decisive progress in arms control and an overall reduction in the number of nuclear weapons. At the same time, it was fully aware of the dangers which could affect the NPT. There were still some 20 non-party States, including some which had the capacity to make nuclear weapons. The success of the NPT would depend on the willingness of threshold States and other States outside the NPT to accede to it, or at least to comply with its provisions. He appealed to all those States which had not yet acceded to the NPT to do so.

Another danger arose from within: the Treaty obliged non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to refrain from any activity which might lead to the acquisition of nuclear weapons. The system of safeguards set up to verify that obligation, however, applied only to "source or special fissionable material". Other materials and equipment, even those which were essential for the manufacture of nuclear weapons, did not fall under that system and, unfortunately, there has been attempts to acquire such material and equipment. The Conference could not ignore that fundamental issue, and should, in addition, make it clear that Parties must not assist non-nuclear-weapon States in any possible way to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Both nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States should refrain from providing such assistance. Countries exporting nuclear technology had a special responsibility in that regard. His country's policy was that exports of nuclear material to non-Parties to the NPT, as well as specially designed or prepared equipment, were allowed only if all nuclear activities in the recipient State were under IAEA safeguards.

Yet another danger arose from the fact that not all signatory States had complied with the obligation to conclude a safeguards agreement with the IAEA within two years of accession. As recognized in the European Council's declaration on nuclear proliferation, in June 1990, IAEA safeguards were the corner-stone of an effective non-proliferation régime.

The NPT established a close connecton between non-proliferation, arms control and co-operation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy. In recent years, co-operation had taken many different forms, both within the framework of the IAEA and outside it. In that connection, the IAEA had submitted a

background paper on its activities relevant to article IV of the NPT (NPT/CONF.IV/13). It was important that such co-operation should be further developed over the coming years. The global energy supply, in which nuclear energy played a role, required co-operation, and safe use of nuclear energy also called for fresh initiatives involving international co-operation.

In 1995, the States Parties would have to decide for how long they wished the Treaty to be extended, thus giving an implicit indication of the value they attached to the NPT. The forthcoming discussions in the present Conference would set the course for the review, and the extension of the NPT, which it was to be hoped would take place in a single conference in 1995.

It should be stressed that the NPT had proved its value by making a significant and indispensable contribution to international stability. There was no real alternative which could command the support of important nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States alike. While what had been achieved gave cause for satisfaction, it was essential to continue the work on the task set by the NPT, namely a further strengthening of the international norm against proliferation. The next five years might well be decisive in that regard.

Mr. KARHILO (Finland) said that his Government regarded the NPT as irreplaceable: it was a corner-stone of security for everyone, whether or not a State Party, and it was also the foundation for international nuclear trade and for the use of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.

Finland welcomed the fact that, since the previous Conference in 1985, awareness of the indispensability of the NPT had grown. It was pleased to see China and France participate as observers for the first time and hoped that those two States would soon accede to the NPT. As stated in their memorandum (NPT/CONF.IV/18), the Nordic Governments were convinced that universal adherence to the NPT and full compliance with its obligations were the best approach to achieving the goals of the NPT, namely to avert the spread of nuclear weapons, to eliminate and reduce nuclear weapons, and to promote international co-operation in the field of peaceful uses of atomic energy.

The period under review had seen a fundamental change for the better in East-West relations and the danger of global nuclear war was at its lowest level ever. The changing role of nuclear weapons in military strategy was even more important in the long run than reductions in numbers and types of nuclear weapons. With the crumbling of East-West confrontation, it had become

possible to reduce nuclear forces to a minimum. In Europe, a process was under way whereby the adversaries of yesterday were becoming tomorrow's partners in security. For Finland, a European neutral, that development was a source of profound satisfaction.

The present crisis in the Gulf area underlined the importance of effective barriers against the spread and use of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, and it also testified to the urgency of a total ban on nuclear weapons. In Finland's view, the basic obligations of non-transfer and non-acquisition of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, as embodied in articles I and II of the NPT, had been complied with. The letter of the NPT had been observed but there was reason for concern as to the spirit. Article I might not dictate, but it certainly implied, unflagging and consistent efforts by nuclear-weapon States to deny potential proliferators any assistance and to persuade them to cease all suspect activities.

A grave danger to international peace and security persisted inasmuch as some non-nuclear-weapon States might have already acquired or be actively pursuing nuclear-weapon capability; such danger was particularly acute in regions where tensions were already running high. Where there were doubts, States should make known their situation and become Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The acceptance of safeguards in accordance with article III gave effect and expression to the fundamental commitment by each non-nuclear-weapon State Party under article II. Prompt conclusion of a safeguards agreement with the IAEA was a sine qua non for the credibility of the commitments under article II.

The period since the previous Conference had seen a change with far-reaching implications. As a result of the incident at Chernobyl, peaceful use of nuclear energy had come under a cloud. Assuring nuclear safety should be viewed not only as a national but also as an international obligation, something that the States Parties should bear in mind when implementing the provisions of article IV. Since the Treaty had come into force, world production of nuclear energy had grown more than twenty-fold, and a development of such magnitude would not have been possible without the Treaty and related safeguards agreement. For the energy economies of many countries, such as Finland, dependent on the availability of nuclear fuel or services from abroad, the continued functioning of international trade and the arrangements based on the Treaty must be guaranteed.

Effective safeguards were a prerequisite for the implementation of the Treaty. The IAEA safeguards system had been functioning successfully but, in order to continue to do so, the Parties to the Treaty must co-operate more fully with the Agency. Inspection efforts could be facilitated and information provided more promptly. Despite the financing problems being faced by the Agency the necessary resources must be provided so that it could administer growing safeguards activities. At the same time, more attention should be paid to improving safeguards methods. His country considered that all non-nuclear-weapon States should accept full-scope safeguards for their nuclear activities and, to that end, urged all States to require such safeguards as a condition for their nuclear exports.

As to the ultimate purpose of the Treaty in contributing to the prevention of nuclear war, for the first time in history some nuclear weapons had actually been eliminated and more substantial cuts were foreseen for the future. Other ancilliary measures to improve stability and prevent nuclear miscalculation had also been agreed on. However, the same could not be said for efforts to achieve a nuclear-test ban, which Finland considered to be the surest means of slowing down the development of nuclear weapons. A complete ban on nuclear testing would also remove the related environental risks; environmental concerns had contributed considerably to the decision to ban atmospheric tests under the Partial Test-Ban Treaty and scientific evidence suggested that there was no such thing as environmentally safe underground testing either.

His country was particularly concerned about tests in the Arctic, which was a singularly vulnerable environment and where the utmost care was needed to avoid the risks of radioactive pollution. The adequacy of safety measures at test sites was being questioned by countries, including his own, which feared that they were receiving radioactivity from test explosions in their vicinity. Nuclear-weapon States should invite independent experts from affected States to familiarize themselves with safety measures at test sites. Finland welcomed the signing of the verification protocols to the United States-Soviet Threshold Treaties, which should lead to further constraints in testing. The Amendment Conference for the Partial Test Ban Treaty afforded an opportunity for all States to discuss issues relating to the banning of nuclear tests and it was to be hoped that it would narrow the

differences enough to enable real progress to be made at the appropriate forum - the recently established Ad hoc Committee of the Conference on Disarmament.

States which had refrained from the option of acquiring nuclear weapons by joining the Treaty had the right to expect the nuclear-weapon States to renounce the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against them. As political perceptions and military doctrines changed favourably, a new look at the issue of security assurances would be justified. His delegation appreciated the proposals made in that respect by Nigeria and Egypt. In its view, security assurances should be binding and comprehensive and should ensure respect for the equality and integrity of all non-nuclear-weapon States having committed themselves to non-proliferation. While recent developments had helped to enhance the security of non-nuclear-weapon States, they did not obviate the need for effective security assurances as long as nuclear weapons existed.

The regional approach to non-proliferation, acknowledged by article VII of the Treaty, could effectively complement the global undertaking. Indeed, the Treaties of Rarotonga and Tlatelolco were intended to do just that. Finland itself had long sought to consolidate the existing nuclear-weapon-free status of the Nordic countries and considered that the changing security situation in Europe had further strengthened that status. It would therefore continue to co-operate closely with the other Nordic countries on that matter.

The NPT was the most widely accepted international security agreement. It served to stabilize the world with respect to the most destructive weapons in existence, acted as a spur to disarmament efforts and provided the safest available means to derive peaceful benefits from nuclear technology. The Nordic Governments therefore supported efforts aimed at ensuring the prolongation of the Treaty indefinitely and thus the continued effectiveness of the non-proliferation régime. His delegation believed that such efforts should begin soon after the current Review Conference.

Ms. Mason (Canada), Vice-President, took the Chair.

Mr. DATO BIN HITAM (Malaysia) said that more than any other instrument in international relations, the Non-Proliferation Treaty dealt with a very crucial concern of mankind: to ensure survival by preventing mass destruction. There was, however, a gulf between the lofty purposes of the Treaty and the provisions of its implementing articles. In a practical

manner, the Treaty accepted the notion that a small number of States already in possession of nuclear weapons could keep them, whereas others had undertaken not to acquire or develop them. Nuclear weapons had thus assumed a decisive role as the "weapons of deterrence" of the super-Powers and, for over two decades, the Treaty had been caught up in super-Power rivalries, resulting in inadequate implementation of the provisions on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy on the one hand and the potential development of nuclear-weapon capability by other States on the other.

Malaysia had earlier subscribed to the Treaty, in the conviction that it provided a sound beginning for global denuclearization and a foundation for the establishment of a régime of international co-operation for the development of nuclear science and technology for peaceful uses, thus ultimately becoming a framework for the development of nuclear science and technology for the well-being and safety of mankind. However, from such a standpoint, the achievements of the Treaty over the past 20 years had not been encouraging. Indeed, the many United Nations and international resolutions concerning the acquisition of nuclear-weapon capability were a manifestation of well-founded concern about nuclear proliferation, compounded by the very urgent and real threats of other forms of mass destruction - from chemical, radiological and biological weapons, for example

However, despite such weaknesses, the NPT's importance to the safety and well-being of mankind had not diminished. The Conference was an opportunity to reaffirm adherence to it and renew determination to support the programmes which had been adopted to achieve its objectives. It was one of the earliest international instruments to have recognized that mankind shared a common destiny, and the full attainment of its objectives was of concern to all States. It was gratifying to note the growing realization by the international community of that common concern and of global interdependence among States and peoples. For that reason, his delegation called for a clear programme of action to secure universal accession to the Treaty under the terms of international law and practice. It was undesirable that large sectors of humanity should not be covered by security standards adhered to by the Parties to the Treaty.

His delegation also regarded the Conference as an occasion to reaffirm the call to continue and strengthen the Treaty beyond 1995. Deep changes that were positive and fostered international peace and co-operation were taking

place in the international scene. His delegation was encouraged by the largely positive stands taken by the delegations of the United States and the Soviet Union towards outstanding NPT issues and urged other developed countries to do likewise.

Such positive trends were, however, accompanied by signs of instability as societies grappled with political, economic and social reforms following the reduction of East-West tensions and rivalry. The Conference must clearly call for an end to such tendencies and for the initiation of remedial measures with proper regard for the long-term interests of mankind, societies and individuals. Once a common human destiny was accepted as a clear basic strategy of the Treaty in its next phase of development, the Conference would have taken a very important decision. To that end, the Conference should find the political will to call in a final document for the continuation of the Treaty as a precursor of complete nuclear disarmament and of international co-operation in nuclear science and technology for the safety and well-being of mankind.

In addition to such basic considerations, other important issues should also be addressed. International developments suggested that the Treaty could not stand alone if it was to retain its pivotal role in global peace and stability and that fresh approaches must be made to reinforce it. Threats of the use of nuclear weapons must not be available to any State and no State should feel compelled to seek security in nuclear deterrence. All countries, must rely on the guarantee of the United Nations collective security system as the only fair and just system that would not undermine the safety and well-being of mankind. International efforts and wisdom must be focused on examining that system and the Parties to the Treaty must move ahead towards the achievement of complete nuclear disarmament and develop the widest application of nuclear science for peaceful uses.

Areas declared as nuclear-weapon-free zones now made up more than a quarter of the earth's surface. In South-East Asia, members of ASEAN had declared their determination to establish a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality, which would be free from nuclear weapons. His country was pleased that no regional State had objected to such an effort and hoped that all obstacles to the establishment of the zone would be removed in the near future. In that context it would be useful if the Review Conference would take cognizance of the ASEAN effort and urge States Parties to the NPT and others to encourage its realization.

It was also necessary to strengthen the safeguards system and programmes in order to enhance confidence in the Treaty and incentives for its universal acceptance. He therefore supported the call by the IAEA's Director-General at the opening meeting of the Conference for an enhanced system of safeguards that would cover areas of weakness inherent in the Treaty. Another, equally important aspect of safeguards as a confidence-building instrument was adherence by all Parties. The Treaty should not be weakened in any manner through non-compliance or conditionality.

As the agenda of the Conference suggested, a great deal of work on the Treaty remained to be done. In that respect his delegation felt that fresh impetus should be injected into efforts for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy; transfer of technology was not only an incentive for universalization of the Treaty but was also a disincentive for recourse to the nuclear weapons option. His delegation agreed with others that special significance was attached to the current Conference, implying greater willingness to proceed earnestly to discharge obligations and responsibilities and vigorously pursue the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test ban treaty, the elimination of all tactical nuclear forces, the prevention of an arms race in space, and a prohibition on the production and trade of fissile materials for nuclear weapons. In the context of improved East-West relations, he called upon Parties to the Treaty to rise to the challenges of the day and fulfil the great expectations of all mankind.

Mr. PIREK (Czech and Slovak Federal Republic) said that his country's two nations, engaged in rediscovering the ideals and principles of pluralistic democracy and the authentic values of European civilization, were eager to assist in introducing new viable international structures. Together with other European nations, the United States and Canada, Czechoslovakia was endeavouring to devise an original concept for a reliable security system in Europe and the adequate institutionalization of the Helsinki process. It was confident that the results of the two sets of negotiations taking place in Vienna, as well as the Paris Summit of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, would make a significant contribution to the attainment of those goals. Unfortunately, the prevailing positive trends were disrupted by irresponsible power ambitions. In his opinion, the solution to the current explosive situation in the Gulf lay in the implementation of the relevant Security Council resolutions.

The Non-Proliferation Treaty, which had stood the test of time and would undoubtedly count among the foundation stones of the new security system emerging in Europe and the world at large, constituted an important norm of international law, exerting considerable influence on the development of international relations in the field of arms reduction and disarmament. The Treaty enjoyed prestige among States and, in terms of the number of States Parties, ranked among the most representative disarmament instruments adopted since the Second World War. His Government was convinced of the Treaty's continuing viability beyond the year 1995 and was opposed to any pointless revision aimed at weakening or devaluing the Treaty.

It was gratified to note, that in the past five years, there had been no breach of the Treaty and that all States Parties, both nuclear and non-nuclear, had continued to comply with their commitments. That fact was important above all for the review of the Treaty's key provisions contained in articles I and II. Although reports were received from time to time concerning attempts - generally by non-party States - to manufacture a nuclear weapon, there had so far been no direct official evidence to confirm such activities. Notwithstanding the substantial growth of trade in nuclear technology and the world-wide utilization of nuclear energy, the official list of countries possessing nuclear weapons remained unchanged. That, however, should not diminish the world's vigilance and alertness, particularly with regard to efforts by some States gradually to build up a base for the development and manufacture of components of nuclear weapons. The same applied to the sensitive and increasingly topical issue of procurement of delivery systems and their technology. The presence of nuclear weapons, especially in conflict-ridden regions, would pose a serious threat to strategic stability and universal peace.

His Government was pleased to note that the number of non-nuclear-States Parties to the Treaty had progressively increased over the years, a positive trend which attested to the Treaty's importance and credibility, and joined in the appeal to countries still outside the Treaty to review their position and accede to it as soon as possible.

The system of safeguards developed on the basis of article III and applied through the International Atomic Energy Agency offered a possibility of objectively reviewing the question of compliance with the NPT. In recent years the Agency had developed and verified a system of safeguards for nuclear

equipment of all kinds, and its experienced inspectors added to the credibility of the results of verification activities. Nevertheless, his delegation was not fully satisfied with those activities. The basic document of the safeguards system dated back more than 20 years and some of its parameters no longer corresponded to current needs. After carrying out a thorough analysis of the situation, his Government had, within the framework of IAEA, put forward a proposal for a modified approach to the application of safeguards. Flexible implementation of that proposal would eliminate existing shortcomings, ease the financial implications and contribute towards development of safeguards that could ensure effective as well as reliable control of the development of nuclear energy into the twenty-first century. At the same time, his Government was convinced that the Treaty's prestige would be substantially enhanced if the nuclear Powers subjected all of their peaceful nuclear activities to IAEA safeguards. Again, it recommended the most economical approach while stressing practical aspects. In its view, the submission and verification of exhaustive reports on the materials balance should be combined with the gradual expansion of a new system of random inspections.

Despite the tragic accident at Chernobyl, the peaceful uses of nuclear energy had continued to expand, attention being mainly focused on improving the quality of safety measures. Nuclear energy remained the most promising resource for meeting the energy needs of many countries. His Government therefore advocated further mutually beneficial development of international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy subject to the observance of the international safeguards in accordance with article IV of the Treaty. In that context, it appreciated the conclusions of the PUNE Conference held in Geneva in 1986. In his country, the development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy was unthinkable without international co-operation. Environmental and economic considerations had led his Government to the decision to utilize the country's uranium deposits in order to launch a relatively extensive nuclear energy programme. Eight blocks of light-water reactors with outputs of 440 MW per unit were currently in operation and another four blocks of the same capacity, as well as two 1,000 MW blocks, were under construction. All those power stations had been built according to Soviet designs and the fuel elements had also been supplied by the USSR until the present. For many years, his country had also enjoyed co-operation with Western producers of

nuclear plant and equipment; all the blocks in operation included diagnostic systems supplied by Siemens, and a Western-made comprehensive control system was to be installed at the nuclear power plant being built at Mochovce. So far as the construction of new nuclear plants was concerned, Czechoslovakia had established contacts with firms in the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Finland, Italy, the Soviet Union and other countries, with a view to acquiring the most advanced technical equipment so as to guarantee maximum security.

The new situation also called for fundamental changes in the fuel cycle. Czechoslovakia was at present studying the possibility of long-term storage in its own territory of spent fuel which, in the past, had been returned to the USSR, as well as the possibility of its being processed by a suitable partner. The preparation of co-operation agreements with other States in the nuclear field involved certain problems of a legislative nature. Czechoslovakia's export and import policy had hitherto been based exclusively on the non-proliferation principle embodied in the NPT. Issues relating to ensuring safeguards outside the Treaty framework or in the event of IAEA being unable to discharge its duties under article III were not as yet regulated by the national legislation. Such regulation was, however, indispensable in order to conclude agreements with a number of States. His Government intended to look to the best solutions and experience of other States Parties in preparing the necessary legal adjustments.

As to the review of articles V, VI and VII, he wished to emphasize that the gradual and consistent construction of a world free of nuclear weapons was a priority in his country's foreign policy. Like most other participants in the Conference, Czechoslovakia was not fully satisfied with the implementation of the provisions of article VI, although it was true that more had been done in that field since the 1985 Review Conference than in all previous years taken together. His country expected that process to continue and hoped to see it advance to the stage of multilateral negotiations in the near future. In that context, it greatly appreciated the Soviet-United States INF Agreement, in whose implementation it was partly involved. The Agreement, which had launched a process of real disarmament in the nuclear field, should be supplemented in the foreseeable future by a radical reduction in the two Powers' offensive strategic weapons, something his Government strongly favoured. In view of the London Declaration of the NATO countries in July 1990, the start of negotiations on the elimination of all tactical

nuclear weapons in Europe seemed promising. The time was approaching when the process of nuclear disarmament should be joined by the other nuclear Powers. It was to be hoped that their participation in the relevant negotiations would not be linked to any preconditions. The first step towards that end might be the adoption of so-called negative assurances.

General and complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests was the most effective way of halting the escalation of armaments and achieving nuclear disarmament. Unfortunately, the results expected had not been achieved; although the additional protocols to the Soviet-United States agreements on nuclear-weapon tests of 1974 and 1976 had been signed at the Soviet-United States summit in Washington earlier in 1990, they had not yet been ratified. It was to be hoped that resumed negotiations would result in a significant limitation by both Powers of the number and energy yield of their nuclear tests. At the Conference on Disarmament, the matter had remained in a state of protracted stagnation. The Czechoslovak delegation was among those trying to find ways of overcoming the impasse. It was to be hoped that the recently established Ad Hoc Committee would at long last produce tangible results. One possible solution might be found in the non-aligned countries' proposal that the validity of the Partial Test-Ban Treaty should be extended to cover underground testing. Czechoslovakia, for its part, was making responsible and serious preparations for the United Nations conference to be held in New York at the beginning of 1991.

An essential element in strengthening the non-proliferation régime was respect for the status of existing nuclear-weapon-free zones, including those established under the Tlatelolco and Rarotonga Treaties. Czechoslovakia supported all constructive proposals for the creation of new nuclear-weapon-free zones.

His Government considered that all international institutions and forums concerned should energetically step up their efforts to solve the whole set of issues relating to nuclear disarmament and was strongly in favour of enhancing the role of the United Nations in that regard. At the same time, it also advocated a radical improvement in the effectiveness of multilateral disarmament mechanisms, including the Conference on Disarmament.

Lastly the Treaty had fully proved itself in the 20 years since its coming into force. It was to be hoped that the present Conference and its final document would help to preserve and strengthen that important instrument at the threshold of a new millenium.

Mr. ENE (Romania) said that the present Review Conference, even more than its predecessors, afforded an opportunity to assess the results achieved both individually and collectively in the field of nuclear non-proliferation, with special emphasis on what still remained to be done. The profound changes taking place in international life, including both positive developments and alarming convulsions, the progress achieved and the efforts in making headway towards the reduction of nuclear weapons, and the fact that the present Conference was in many ways a prelude to the crucial Review Conference of 1995 made the occasion a special one. His country approached the issues on the agenda with realism and hoped that the Conference's work would be conducted in a positive and constructive spirit so as to give fresh impetus to the implementation of the NPT in its entirety.

Romania was fulfilling in good faith the obligations it had assumed under the Non-Proliferation Treaty and it co-operated with other States Parties in achieving the NPT's objectives. Soon after the Revolution of December 1989, his Government had issued a statement declaring null and void any agreements concluded by the former dictatorial régime that might be in contradiction with the international obligations assumed by Romania in the field of nuclear non-proliferation, as, indeed, in any other field. Romania had also joined the group of countries exporters of nuclear materials, equipment and technologies by officially accepting the non-proliferation standards agreed upon by those countries. At the beginning of August 1990, it had formally joined the IAEA's Guidelines for Nuclear Transfers. Other similar measures in the field of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction were under way. Romania was ready to join international arrangements with regard to the non-proliferation of chemical weapons, and action had been taken at national level to provide the necessary regulations and machinery which would guarantee strict non-proliferation controls and co-operation with other States on that issue under conditions of privatization and a market economy.

Against a background of positive developments in Europe and other parts of the world, the past five years had also been marked by notable developments in regard to non-proliferation. Horizontal and vertical nuclear non-proliferation had become one of the international community's central concerns. Positive experience acquired in that field had extended to chemical and biological weapons and, more recently, to the means of delivery of such weapons. The agreements reached, as well as the fact that other important agreements were being negotiated, were to be welcomed.

The peaceful uses of nuclear energy enjoyed widespread recognition as an important instrument of economic and social development. His Government welcomed the increased IAEA concern for nuclear power-plant safety and the Agency's active contribution in promoting international co-operation. The Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, both of which had been ratified by Romania three months previously, offered a firm legal foundation for such activities. Another step in the right direction would be to assure the physical security of nuclear plants against military attack, and his Government welcomed the initiative taken by Sweden, the Netherlands and Hungary in bringing that issue before the Conference.

The positive results achieved since the entry into force of the Non-Proliferation Treaty demonstrated the important role that the NPT played in maintaining international peace and security and promoting development, something that must be borne in mind in 1995 when the States Parties met to decide on the Treaty's further duration. In view of the recent positive developments in international relations and the democratization and improved human rights situation in Europe, the coming five years offered a unique opportunity to prepare the groundwork for the abolition of nuclear weapons. The Conference sought to give fresh impetus to that goal by improving upon the inadequacies of the non-proliferation régime so as to make the spread of nuclear weapons more difficult. The Conference must also attach priority to the early completion of the Soviet-United States negotiations on a 50 per cent reduction in strategic nuclear weapons, the beginning of a new series of negotiations on short-range nuclear missiles in Europe and a re-evaluation of nuclear weapons strategy in the light of new political realities. It was also important to give legal force to the obligation of States not to resort to the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The issue of security assurances for non-nuclear States should no longer create difficulties. The steps taken to reduce nuclear weapons were most gratifying, but such efforts must also help achieve another objective of the Treaty - a ban on all nuclear tests. Romania welcomed the recent initiative by six non-aligned States in that matter.

To be effective, any non-proliferation régime must also include measures to prevent access to nuclear materials, equipment and technology for non-peaceful uses. In that connection, Romania fully supported the IAEA safeguards and other international arrangements in the field of transfers, an

essential part of the non-proliferation régime that should be valid for all States. By the same token, the peaceful use of nuclear materials and technology should be encouraged without discrimination.

Lastly, it was satisfying to see that a number of non-States Parties were participating in the Confernece, for the NPT was one of the main pillars of international peace and stability.

Mr. STEPHANOU (Greece) welcomed the presence of two nuclear-weapon States, France and China, as observers and called upon them to accede to the Treaty. It was to be hoped that the NPT, with its increasing acceptance by the international community, would continue to dissuade non-nuclear-weapon States from seeking nuclear-weapon capability. Greece, one of the first States to have signed and ratified the Treaty, was firmly committed to the NPT's goals and to implementation of the Treaty, which still played a crucial role in maintaining international peace and security.

Greece had always recognized the right of every State to benefit from nuclear energy for peaceful uses. Unfortunately, that right had not always been realized under credible and effective international safeguards. An equitable and stable framework for international nuclear trade was essential. International co-operation would be severely disrupted if the safeguards system were to be abandoned. Greece therefore strongly supported the application of IAEA safeguards on a universal basis and acknowledged the indispensable role played by the Agency through its safeguards controls, which helped ensure the effectiveness of the non-proliferation régime. On the European level, the Euratom safeguards were applied within the European Community, and the results were verified by the IAEA.

His delegation reaffirmed its full support of IAEA activities in the fields of nuclear safety and co-operation on nuclear research and development. Studies conducted by the Agency on the impact of the Chernobyl accident had demonstrated that national and international nuclear safety were inextricably linked. The same applied to problems of nuclear waste disposal. In that context, Greece would also support any efforts to remove the current lacunae in the international safeguards and the non-proliferation régime.

Despite the continuing risk that yet more countries might acquire nuclear weapons and the fact that a number of States continued to remain outside the non-proliferation régime, important progress had been achieved in recent years: the INF Treaty, the Stockholm Conference on Disarmament in Europe

agreement, the verification protocols for the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the Treaty on Peaceful Nuclear Explosions, and the agreement between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to destroy chemical weapons were all encouraging signs that the two super-Powers were on the right path towards genuine nuclear disarmament and a reduction in vertical proliferation. His delegation looked forward to further progress towards the completion by the end of 1990 of a number of bilateral agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union on strategic nuclear weapons and chemical weapons.

A comprehensive test ban would have special meaning for the non-proliferation régime and should remain a long-term objective of the nuclear-weapon States. The step-by-step approach undertaken by the two super-Powers towards achieving further limitations on nuclear testing and their commitment to a prompt ratification of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the Treaty on Peaceful Nuclear Explosions should not be regarded as being a negative aspect of the implementation of article VI of the Treaty. Another positive development was the establishment in July 1990 at the Conference on Disarmament of an Ad Hoc Committee on nuclear tests.

It was regrettable that not all States had become Parties to the NPT which continued to be of vital importance in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and thus enhancing international security and stability. The present Conference must be used to ensure that, in 1995, the Treaty was extended for an indefinite period.

The meeting rose at 5.30 p.m.

PROVISIONAL

For participants only

NPT/CONF.IV/SR.6
30 November 1990

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FOURTH REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

PROVISIONAL SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 6th MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 23 August 1990, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. de RIVERO (Peru)

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Programme of work (continued)

General debate (continued)

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The meeting was called to order at 10.20 a.m.

PROGRAMME OF WORK (agenda item 10) (continued) (NPT/CONF.IV/CRP.1)

The PRESIDENT suggested that the participants should adopt the programme of work (NPT/CONF.IV/CRP.1) relating to the organization of the work of the Plenary and Main Committees over the following days. If there was no objection, he would take it that the programme of work was adopted.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT said that at the first plenary meeting the Secretary-General of the Conference had read out a statement describing the serious financial situation of the Conference. He in turn wished to make an urgent appeal to all States parties to pay their contributions in advance. Delegations should contact the Conference secretariat for information on the appropriate means of payment.

GENERAL DEBATE (agenda item 12) (continued)

Mr. TCHEUL (Democratic People's Republic of Korea) said that the work of the Conference would be of historic importance, in view of developments in the international political situation during the past five years and in view of the 1995 deadline, when it would have to be decided whether to extend the Treaty. The Fourth Review Conference also provided the opportunity, for the first time, to consider the NPT's operation in the light of the new trend towards reconciliation and détente, and to take a number of indispensable measures in the area of nuclear disarmament in order to ensure that the Treaty was kept in force.

The NPT had already played a significant role in that no new nuclear-weapon State had emerged in recent years. Since the Third Review Conference efforts had been made by the nuclear-weapon States to achieve nuclear disarmament and progress had been made towards that goal. The 1987 Treaty between the United States and the USSR on the Elimination of their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, the prospects for strategic arms reductions and the unilateral reduction of certain tactical nuclear weapons aroused hopes that negotiations on nuclear disarmament would extricate themselves from their three-decade-long stagnation. It was for the Conference to see that those hopes were fulfilled.

It was essential, first of all, to evaluate the situation correctly. The NPT had more contracting parties than any other international instrument, but although 20 years had passed since its entry into force, its implementation

had not led to the expected levels of reduction. The nuclear weapons whose reduction was currently being planned represented less than 4 per cent of the total arsenal, and even if strategic arms were reduced by 50 per cent as against the 30 per cent currently proposed, their number would still be higher than when the Treaty had been concluded. The only difference was that the visible quantitative arms race, had been replaced by an invisible qualitative race that was even affecting outer space. The progress in the negotiations on nuclear disarmament in recent years seemed to be attributable more to the change in East-West relations than to an awareness by the nuclear-weapon States of their obligations under the Treaty. There was a continuing imbalance between the latter and the other States with respect to the implementation of the Preamble and provisions of the Treaty. It was regrettable that the efforts by the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT to implement its provisions continued to fail because the nuclear-weapon States that were also parties did not implement them.

The current détente and co-operation provided a favourable opportunity for adopting decisive measures to attain the Treaty's fundamental objectives. To adapt the Treaty to a constantly-changing situation, it should be complemented by effective measures enabling it to fulfil its mission more satisfactorily. First of all, the nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT must be prohibited from deploying their weapons outside their territory. Twenty years before, the Cold War and the confrontation between States had made it impossible to conclude an agreement on that question, but the current situation provided a fundamentally different climate. Now that the nuclear-weapon States were moving towards co-operation and abandoning the idea of confrontation, there was no longer any objection to banning such deployment in other countries. That type of measure would also reflect the will of the nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty to attain its basic objectives and to contribute effectively to the elimination of the risk of nuclear war.

The creation of nuclear-free zones was one of the most effective ways to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, but reality had shown that the treaties already concluded in that area were not complied with by the nuclear-weapon States. Yet it should not be such a great sacrifice for them to acknowledge the importance of establishing such zones and express their intention to respect them. As to the nuclear-free zones established by the non-nuclear-weapon States to prevent nuclear proliferation, it would be sufficient for the nuclear-weapon States not to impede their establishment.

A comprehensive nuclear test ban was absolutely essential to stop the nuclear arms race and put an end to the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons, which aroused as many fears as their numerical increase, since it maintained their destructive capacity at the same level and aggravated the risk of nuclear war. Until the nuclear-weapon States showed their political will to conclude a comprehensive test-ban treaty as soon as possible, their commitment to ending the nuclear arms race would remain doubtful and the authority of the NPT uncertain. In that connection, his delegation endorsed the proposals for a moratorium on nuclear testing, if only through 1995.

The most effective security guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons by the non-nuclear-weapon countries was obviously complete nuclear disarmament, but it was no less obvious that until that became a reality, legally-binding guarantees prohibiting such use would be more valid than a mere unilateral and conditional declaration. The non-aligned and neutral countries had called for the adoption of an international instrument of that type, as had Nigeria, Egypt and many other countries.

An agreement in principle during the present Conference on the above-mentioned problems would be of decisive importance in strengthening the non-proliferation régime and ushering in a climate favourable to the Treaty's extension.

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea had acceded to the NPT in very particular circumstances. The Korean people was one of the only peoples to have experienced the threat of nuclear weapons. In the early 1950s, threats to use the atomic bomb against it had led to the separation of the families of several million inhabitants. In early 1957, when the question of non-proliferation had first been raised, nuclear weapons had been deployed in the southern part of the peninsula. Beginning in 1976, joint military exercises known as "Team Spirit", in which one nuclear-weapon State had participated, had begun in the same region. The exercises had grown even bigger in size in the mid-1980s, with the participation of 200,000 soldiers as opposed to 60,000 at the outset and the execution of nuclear war manoeuvres with the mobilization of airborne command posts and vectors. His Government had thus found itself obliged to seek a decisive measure of protection. That was what had prompted it to consider acceding to the NPT, the only international instrument at that time explicity to call for as rapid a halt as possible to the nuclear arms race and to set nuclear disarmament as its basic

objective. By contributing to the Treaty's universality and to the strengthening of the non-proliferation régime, it had encouraged general nuclear disarmament while consolidating its own security. Furthermore, the legal commitment it had undertaken not to manufacture or import nuclear weapons had helped to reduce the imminent nuclear threat.

Unfortunately, events had not come up to its expectations. Whereas considerable progress had been made in other areas in reducing nuclear weapons, none of those weapons had disappeared from the Korean peninsula and no sign of a reduction had been noted. Every year, nuclear war exercises in the peninsula took on an increasingly menacing dimension. In addition, there had never been a favourable response to its proposals for a considerable reduction in conventional forces in northern and southern Korea with a view to creating a climate conducive to the dismantling of nuclear weapons, or for negotiations aimed at making the Korean peninsula a nuclear-free zone. His country had thus had to be more circumspect in dealing with the problem of concluding a safeguards agreement, anxious as it was to comply with its obligations under the Treaty but also to safeguard its national security.

The safeguards negotiations begun with IAEA the main agreement concluded in July 1990 on all points, with the exception of one provision concerning the entry into force of the safeguards, and the agreement to continue the negotiations indicated that his Government was fully determined to meet its obligations under article III of the Treaty.

Regarding national security, his Government was concerned about eliminating the current nuclear threat, which presupposed the satisfactory implementation of article VI of the Treaty. The problem of concluding a safeguards agreement would be resolved as soon as the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had been given a legal guarantee that its security would be ensured until such time as nuclear disarmament had been achieved. His delegation was convinced that the international trend towards détente and co-operation should enable such a solution to be reached. In addition, the encouraging remarks by the party concerned regarding the elimination of the nuclear threat to the country increased confidence that a solution to that problem would be found.

It should also be noted that it had been agreed to begin North-South political-military talks in September. Those would be the first of their kind in the history of the Korean peninsula and would be attended by both

delegations headed by their Prime Ministers. The disarmament of the peninsula would be one of the priority items on the agenda for those talks. The presence of huge armed forces in the north and south was a major concern for the Korean people and for the neighbouring countries. That military confrontation had often been referred to to justify the deployment of nuclear weapons in the peninsula, but the disarmament talks should create the necessary trust between north and south and in neighbouring countries, and reduce the nuclear threat hanging over the peninsula. Declaring the peninsula a nuclear-free zone would remove one of the potential foci of nuclear war in the world and thereby strengthen the non-proliferation régime.

In conclusion, he expressed the hope that the Conference would make all the parties to the Treaty fully aware of their obligations and enable them to take joint action to implement the Treaty's provisions.

Mr. STAIKOV (Bulgaria) said that the atmosphere in which the Fourth Review Conference was being held could not be more favourable for attainment of the Treaty's main objectives. The democratic process that had begun in Eastern Europe was creating an entirely new international climate in which relations between States were gradually shedding their ideological yoke. The division of Europe was in the process of being overcome, and the blocs, which stated that they no longer regarded each other as adversaries, were preparing to change their military structures and defence policies, thus creating favourable conditions for disarmament over an extended front. In addition, efforts aimed at setting up a European system of collective security were becoming institutionalized, and the bases for world peace were being strengthened.

In Bulgaria, rapid democratic changes and the transition to a market economy were broadening the foreign policy horizon, and the country was firmly committed to economic and political integration with Europe, while preserving the advantages of the relations it had until then maintained with other countries and alliances. His Government would continue to support all efforts aimed at consolidating the foundations of international peace and security, and converting military potential to meet the needs of society. It was precisely in order to achieve those objectives that it remained committed to implementing the principles of the NPT, which it considered to be one of mankind's principal achievements.

The non-proliferation of nuclear weapons was one of the pillars of any nuclear disarmament activity. At a time when the two major nuclear Powers were drastically reducing their arsenals, guaranteeing the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons would create favourable conditions for freely continuing such a process. The participation of the other nuclear States would be absolutely essential in order to go beyond certain limits in those reductions. However, an increase in the number of nuclear-weapon States would entail new risks and exacerbate the problems. That was a further reason why the principles of the NPT should be resolutely supported.

His Government considered that horizontal non-proliferation and the reduction of nuclear arsenals should not be systematically linked. Horizontal non-proliferation played an important part in concerted efforts to ensure mutual security and promote disarmament. Effectively and durably preventing new States from acquiring nuclear weapons would be one of the prerequisites for preventing the aggravation of tensions in international relations and crises that might have fateful consequences for mankind. The NPT was the indispensable basis for international efforts to limit the risk of nuclear war, strengthen stability at the regional and global levels, and develop international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The Treaty should maintain those same objectives in the future.

There was no doubt that the Treaty was an effective instrument for, since its entry into force, no signatory State had acquired nuclear weapons; it was also the most universal international legal instrument on nuclear disarmament, since nearly 90 per cent of the States Members of the United Nations had acceded to it. For that reason, his delegation, which reaffirmed its full support for the purposes and principles of the Treaty, hoped that a constructive approach would be adopted at the 1995 Conference, when the States parties would decide whether to extend it.

His Government was deeply concerned at the fact that certain States that were not parties to the Treaty were seeking to acquire a nuclear capability, and hoped that they would be more emphatically urged to accede to the Treaty. It nevertheless noted with satisfaction that some nuclear-weapon States that were not parties to the Treaty were despite everything taking a definite interest in the non-proliferation régime, as witnessed by the presence of observers for China and France at the Conference.

Bulgaria had been among the first States to sign and ratify the Treaty and to have concluded with IAEA a safeguards agreement on its nuclear activities for peaceful purposes. Since the conclusion of that agreement, the Agency's inspectors had not observed any breach of the régime established under the Treaty, and in order to make the inspectors' work easier his Government had now eliminated the procedure of prior notification of inspection, provided that the experts appointed by IAEA were citizens of countries with which Bulgaria maintained diplomatic relations.

His Government complied strictly with the guidelines for exports of nuclear material, equipment and technology, and in the context of its transition to a market economy and economic liberalization, it was attempting to exercise more rigorous control over the nuclear sector. In the international sphere, his country was actively co-operating in the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and contributed to the IAEA technical assistance and co-operation fund. It received specialists from other IAEA member countries, offered the services of Bulgarian experts and also took advantage of the technical assistance extended by the Agency in the civilian uses of nuclear energy.

Public opinion in Bulgaria was seriously concerned about the direct effects on the population and the environment, of the radioactive contamination resulting from the accident at the Chernobyl power station, and all the necessary studies were being conducted. Bulgaria had signed and ratified the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency. A regional agreement on that question had been concluded among the member countries of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, and in 1989 his Government had signed an agreement with the Greek Government on notification of a nuclear accident and the exchange of information on nuclear facilities.

In Bulgaria, a third of all electric energy was derived from one nuclear power station. The construction of a second power station was being considered, but because of public opposition, expert opinions had been sought with the help of IAEA on the choice of location and the technical specifications of the planned installation, and there was a possibility that construction plans might be dropped. That question was also the subject of bilateral negotiations between Bulgaria and Romania, and of a detailed study by several bodies representing the interests of the population and scientific circles.

His Government was convinced that continued nuclear disarmament efforts would contribute significantly to the strengthening of the non-proliferation régime. The elimination of thousands of intermediate-range and short-range nuclear missiles by the Soviet Union and the United States represented considerable progress towards that end, and it was to be hoped that the agreement concluded in June on a framework for reducing strategic nuclear arsenals would lead to the rapid conclusion of a treaty on the subject and that negotiations on future reductions would begin immediately after the conclusion of the START-I Treaty, which would be fully in keeping with the States parties' commitments under article VI of the Treaty. The unilateral withdrawal of hundreds of tactical nuclear charges by the USSR and the United States was another encouraging sign of full compliance with the provisions of article VI. His Government also welcomed the progress in the negotiations on conventional arms reductions, confidence-building measures in Europe and the prohibition of chemical weapons. And it welcomed the recent signing of the protocols on the control mechanism of the agreements concluded between the USSR and the United States in 1974 and 1976, and hoped that those agreements would be ratified shortly.

In the final document of the Conference, which his delegation hoped would be adopted unanimously, the nuclear-weapon States should make a clear commitment to comply with their obligations under the Treaty. The establishment of an ad hoc committee of the Conference on Disarmament, which should make it possible to begin concrete work on a multilateral treaty on a comprehensive test ban, was another welcome development. The creation of nuclear-free zones in accordance with article VII of the Treaty would also have a positive effect. In the Balkans, Bulgaria's own region, some encouraging progress had been made towards that goal during the past five years, and international arrangements of that type should be formulated and fully implemented. Regarding negative security assurances for the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, which would appear in a legally binding international instrument, his delegation believed that the proposals on that subject should be given thorough consideration in view of the opportunity they offered to strengthen the international régime set forth by the Treaty, which was particularly important at a time of rapid and unprecedented changes throughout the world.

Mr. HOULLEZ (Belgium) noted that since the previous Review Conference, a new era of dialogue and understanding had been ushered in and was already helping to reduce tensions throughout the world. With such prospects for progress, compliance with the fundamental principles of international law was all the more essential.

In the area of disarmament, the INF Agreement, the first since the Second World War to be accompanied by effective verification measures, was being implemented satisfactorily by all the parties. The signing of the START Agreement on the reduction of strategic weapons, which would have a strong impact on the capabilities of the two major nuclear Powers, appeared to be imminent, and the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance, for its part, had repeated its will to begin negotiations on short-range weapons as soon as an agreement on conventional forces in Europe was signed. Similarly, at their London summit, the Heads of State and Government of the Alliance countries had taken full account of the new relations between the countries of Europe, which aroused hopes that the new NATO strategy would be less dependent on nuclear weapons. The United States had in turn announced its intention to refrain from modernizing its LANCE missiles and to withdraw its nuclear artillery from Europe. In the area of the cessation of nuclear testing, too, a welcome sign was the imminent ratification of the protocols to the 1974 and 1976 treaties on thresholds and peaceful nuclear explosions by the two nuclear super-Powers. In that connection, the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban proved that the final objective, to which Belgium was strongly committed, namely, a permanent and verifiable halt to nuclear testing, could finally be achieved.

Noting that negotiations were continuing in the Conference on Disarmament on a complete and universal ban on chemical weapons, his Government hoped that a treaty on the subject would shortly be opened for signature by all States. It also hoped that the rapid conclusion of an agreement on the reduction of conventional forces in Europe and of another agreement on confidence-building and security measures would make a major contribution towards creating conditions in which peace in Europe would be based less on fear of weapons and more on well-founded trust in mutual renouncement of the threat or use of armed force.

In that particularly promising disarmament process, the Treaty continued to occupy an essential position. Having effectively and verifiably renounced nuclear weapons, the States parties were entitled to expect real progress in the area of nuclear disarmament. In that connection, his delegation welcomed the fact that, since the previous Review Conference in 1985, over 10 new members, including Spain, which had a significant nuclear programme, had signed the Treaty. It also welcomed the presence at the Fourth Conference of observers for the two nuclear Powers that were not parties to the Treaty, France and China, which, it was hoped, would rapidly consider acceding to the Treaty.

There were still certain grounds for concern about the proliferation of nuclear weapons, in particular with respect to the States that had not yet made binding and verifiable legal commitments in that area. The proliferation of ballistic missiles was also a source of concern, which was why Belgium, together with other States, had acceded to an international non-proliferation régime in that field and hoped that a growing number of States would support that régime.

It was unfortunate and at times worrying that certain States parties had not yet concluded a safeguards agreement with IAEA, as they were required to do under article III of the Treaty. Such a failure to meet obligations might raise doubts as to the actual political commitment of those States or their genuine will to renounce nuclear weapons, especially when the States involved were ones that had significant nuclear facilities. In that connection, his delegation urged the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which had signed the Treaty in 1985, rapidly to conclude a safeguards agreement with the Agency, in conformity with the promise that that country's representative had recently made at the Conference. His delegation noted with satisfaction that the Agency had not observed any flagrant violations of the provisions of article III of the Treaty since the previous Review Conference. Belgium, for its part, fully supported the Agency in its implementation of safeguards, and in that context, with the co-operation of the members of the European Atomic Energy Community, it had set up a programme aimed at optimizing their implementation.

In his delegation's opinion, widespread safeguards should be applied to all civilian nuclear activities throughout the world, in the nuclear-weapon States, non-nuclear-weapon States and States that were not parties to the Treaty. Belgium would be more inclined to require safeguards as a condition

for exporting nuclear material and equipment if all the exporting States decided to apply that policy; it did not wish to see States that followed less strict rules gain an economic advantage.

There had been continued large-scale international co-operation in the nuclear field during the past five years, and Belgium had continued to contribute to such co-operation, especially by admitting trainees from all regions of the world to its laboratories and companies, by sending its experts and technicians to IAEA meetings and by ensuring that its nuclear industrial sector made a maximum contribution to the safety of its installations.

In that positive context, the disarmament process could no doubt be enhanced if enrichment and reprocessing facilities, which formed the basis for manufacturing nuclear bombs, were placed under IAEA control. That would make it possible to know the exact quantities of fissionable material that States were using to build their military nuclear arsenals, it being understood that controls would cease as soon as the material entered the nuclear weapons manufacturing facilities. Controls would make it possible to verify whether nuclear-weapon States were exceeding the limits they had set themselves and would also eliminate the discrimination argument put forward by certain States that did not wish to accede to the Treaty or refused to place their facilities under IAEA control.

His delegation regretted that the results of the work of the Contact Group entrusted with preparing a draft convention on the prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities had not come up to expectations, and it would support any proposal aimed at remedying the lack of progress in that area.

The 1995 Conference would be an important landmark in the non-proliferation régime, since it would be called upon to decide the Treaty's future. His delegation believed that it would be both irresponsible and very dangerous to allow a régime that had already clearly proved itself to weaken, and it hoped that all States parties, without distinction, would place their facilities under IAEA safeguards. Lastly, considering the positive developments since the previous Review Conference, the work of the Fourth Conference should lead to the adoption of a constructive final document illustrating the ever-increasing importance of the Treaty, which remained the corner-stone of the non-proliferation system.

Mr. CALDERON (Peru) said that it had probably been out of fear of the consequences of a nuclear conflict that the super-Powers had begun negotiations on a treaty to check the proliferation of such weapons of mass destruction. The NPT had been an important initial stage on the road to reason. It was simply one way of creating conditions that would make it possible to eliminate nuclear weapons from the face of the earth once and for all. Non-proliferation did not mean elimination or reduction, but non-reproduction. That was why the Treaty was discriminatory, in two respects. First, it was the first international instrument legally to recognize five States as being the sole nuclear Powers under article IX, paragraph 3. It was perhaps that discriminatory nature that explained the existence of article VI. Indeed, since it was not a nuclear disarmament treaty, its moral authority and universalization depended on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and on nuclear disarmament, two processes leading to general and complete disarmament. Secondly, the Treaty gave preferential treatment to the non-nuclear-weapon States parties. Article IV provided that non-nuclear-weapon States should benefit from the development of the many uses of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

The evaluation of the Treaty's implementation showed that the situation was quite different from that imagined by the negotiators in 1968. To a considerable increase in nuclear weapons and their destructive power had been added latent horizontal proliferation, partly due to a certain flexibility on the part of the few supplier States in the nuclear products trade. But perhaps most surprisingly, the non-proliferation measures applied to other complementary technological fields might endanger security in more than one region of the world and, as a result, peace.

Peru had renounced nuclear weapons when it had acceded to the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; it had done so to preserve world peace, and to devote itself to economic and social development and the struggle against poverty, two priority areas. It was for the same reasons that his Government advocated strengthening the NPT in order to guarantee its extension beyond 1995 and to promote its universalization.

The successful implementation of the 1987 Washington Treaty, on the elimination of intermediate-range and short-range missiles, and the announcement that the super-Powers would be concluding a treaty on the elimination of certain categories of strategic offensive weapons by the end of

the year were examples of the measures that must be taken in order to lessen the disappointment of the non-nuclear-weapon States parties at the implementation of article VI.

However, his Government could not understand why States were still hesitating to enter into multilateral negotiations aimed at prohibiting all nuclear tests. Continued testing for the purpose of further refining weapons or making technological innovations would have a destabilizing effect. A halt to testing would be an appopriate measure for increasing trust among the nuclear Powers. In addition, the large-scale, verifiable reduction of nuclear arsenals and the prohibition of all tests were not incompatible and could be considered top-priority objectives. Giving one precedence over the other would be something new, for article VI drew no distinction in that respect.

His delegation accordingly hoped that the Conference would reach an agreement that fulfilled the international community's demands. The time had come to set a deadline for States parties to take all the necessary measures in order to achieve the cessation of nuclear tests. States might set the 1990s as a deadline and focus their efforts on gradually reducing the number and strength of the tests until they were banned completely. The negotiations might initially be bilateral, between the two super-Powers, then among three or five parties, and finally multilateral. Lastly, a national verification mechanism might be set up and implemented by each of the nuclear Powers; it would be linked to an international verification network under the control of an international body.

It was to be hoped that, at the present Review Conference, the super-Powers would take specific measures to extend the de facto moratorium on the production of special fissionable material intended for the manufacture of nuclear weapons. That would be the best way of strengthening States' trust in the process of world military denuclearization. The United States and the Soviet Union should reaffirm the commitments they had made at the recent Washington summit. The negotiations should include the dismantling of a number of nuclear warheads that appeared in the announced treaty on strategic offensive weapons, as well as providing for the use of recovered fissionable material for civilian purposes.

The universalization of the NPT would depend on how the States parties managed to resolve the problem of latent horizontal proliferation. For the time being, certain suppliers of nuclear material, technology and services were not requiring the importing State to agree to submit all its nuclear

facilities to safeguards. Since the measures taken by the London suppliers group or by the Zangger Committee to check horizontal proliferation had not been sufficient, the only remaining option was greater compliance with the provisions of the Treaty in nuclear trade. What was to be avoided was the creation of an imbalance between the importing States parties to the Treaty and the importing States that were not parties. The same restrictions could not be imposed on both categories without requiring in return that they meet the same obligations. Putting them on an equal footing would amount to ascribing the same intentions to them, which would lessen the Treaty's importance. It was absolutely essential to set up a consultation mechanism that was limited to States parties in order to settle the question of the supply of nuclear products. The adoption of a code of conduct would be the best solution, provided it did not accord the same treatment to States parties and non-parties. The States parties to the Treaty should also consider concluding agreements on negative security assurances and prohibiting attacks against nuclear facilities.

Although the situation in certain regions of the world was disturbing, the international climate was extremely favourable for considering the Treaty's extension. It was in the interests of all States parties to continue to work towards peace.

Mr. RASAPUTRAM (Sri Lanka) said that the Fourth Review Conference was of particular significance. The assessment of two decades of Treaty operation would set the stage for the States parties to decide in 1995 whether to extend it. Profound changes had taken place in the world: security was becoming less weaponized and more political, and inter-State relations among traditional adversaries had improved. New tensions and dangers continued to arise within and among States, but some of the seemingly intractable regional problems were in the process of being solved, and the United Nations had been able to reassert its peace-keeping role. Thus the Conference should focus on the question how the NPT might serve peace and the well-being of States parties in the future.

Developments since 1985 provided material for assessing the extent to which problems had been solved or aggravated. The encouraging positive developments should not be allowed to mask what remained to be done. Everyone must work collectively and constructively to address the genuine concerns of the overwhelming majority of non-nuclear States parties to the Treaty.

The political compromise that had given birth to the Treaty had envisaged that it should not only prevent more nuclear-weapon States and new nuclear weapons from emerging, but that it should also propel the nuclear disarmament process towards the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. Sri Lanka was gratified to note that the number of States parties had increased from 130 in 1985 to some 140 at present. Nuclear weapons and the nuclear arms race had been the sine qua non of the cold war, but the time had now come to move away from nuclear terror and to find alternative means of security. His Government earnestly hoped that all States parties, particularly the depositary States, would develop a framework that would support progressive disarmament and alternative means of security through international co-operation.

Sri Lanka had become a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty in the conviction that the Treaty would contribute to international peace and security if implemented in good faith. It had thus joined the group of States that did not believe that the possession of nuclear weapons was a means of ensuring national security. His Government had fulfilled all its obligations and contributed to the efforts to implement the Treaty. It had also reminded the States parties of the collective nature of the obligations entered into under the Treaty. As a non-aligned country, Sri Lanka had not acceded to any nuclear-weapons-related security agreement or any other military alliance system; rather it had sought to ensure its national security through political and diplomatic means. His Government had continued to refuse to allow foreign ships carrying nuclear weapons to enter Sri Lankan ports. It supported international efforts aimed at achieving nuclear disarmament and the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, including zones in south Asia.

The NPT was the most widely accepted arms control treaty. Sri Lanka was particularly pleased to see greater participation by observers at the current Review Conference. All States parties should explore all possibilities of encouraging other States to become interested in the Treaty, in order that its purposes and provisions might enjoy universal acceptance. His delegation believed that the multilateral review of nuclear issues would help to create incentives for wider adherence to the Treaty. Exclusiveness in negotiating nuclear issues should give way to multilateral negotiations in which all concerned parties could play a role in defining the principles and stages of nuclear disarmament.

His Government welcomed the recent progress in bilateral nuclear arms negotiations. Multilateral work on nuclear disarmament issues did not mean that all countries should participate in the START negotiations. Bilateral and multilateral approaches were complementary.

There were a number of reasons why the nuclear-weapon States should demonstrate the political will to make greater use of the multilateral approach to nuclear issues. First, nuclear weapons by their very nature were of concern to all countries, not only to their possessors. Secondly, at a time of considerable progress in bilateral arms negotiations, efforts in that area should be globalized. The development of a framework for multilateral negotiation would be a confidence-building measure, as it could involve not only the existing nuclear-weapon States, but also the non-nuclear-weapon States and other nuclear-capable States. Certain regional nuclear ambiguities could be given some transparency and the problem of latent proliferation addressed. Thirdly, the great majority of States parties saw the NPT not as an end in itself, but as a step in the process of disarmament which must be pursued in a multilateral framework. Like many other States parties, Sri Lanka wished to strengthen the provisions of the Treaty, and wider adherence would be an important step in that direction. Certain countries hesitated to accede to the Treaty for conceptual, legal, political and other reasons.

The non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT believed that parallel ways should be explored to strengthen the Treaty by involving the "threshold countries", which were prepared to manufacture nuclear weapons, in a multilateral process that would make it easier for them to gravitate towards the purposes and provisions of the NPT. A multilateral process in which all nuclear-weapon States and the "threshold States" could participate would be a constructive approach to the desired objective. It derived from the letter and spirit of article VI of the Treaty.

There were many nuclear issues ripe for multilateral treatment. One was the cessation of fissionable material production and the negotiation of a multilaterally verifiable treaty on the subject. A de facto moratorium appeared to exist on the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes in the two major nuclear-weapon States. Concern about nuclear safety had brought to the fore the environmental hazards of both civilian and military nuclear activities. The cessation of fissionable material production for weapons purposes would substantially reduce such hazards and save billions

of dollars needed for the safe revival of aging military nuclear plants. Such a measure might be made multilateral and therefore non-discriminatory. It would also help to address the problem of latent proliferation. That would amount to strong reinforcement of the NPT and an effective parallel measure towards the universalization of the non-proliferation régime.

Turning to the implementation of the Treaty, he was gratified to note, in connection with articles I and II, that IAEA safeguard reports had not recorded any violation of Treaty commitments. He would, however, prefer IAEA safeguard reports to be more transparent, in order to enable States parties and the international community to assess IAEA safeguards activities. He expressed concern at the nuclear trade and the indirect assistance given to nuclear programmes not subject to IAEA safeguards. Of particular concern was the fact that the nuclear facilities of Israel and South Africa were not subject to Agency safeguards. He reiterated that under articles I and II, the transfer of any type of nuclear-weapon-related materials or services between a State party and a non-party, whether a nuclear-weapon or non-nuclear-weapon State, was precluded by the Treaty. Concerning article III, his Government urged States that had significant nuclear programmes to conclude safeguards agreements with IAEA. It also supported any initiative taken to subject civil nuclear facilities of nuclear-weapon States to IAEA safeguards, which would enable the cessation of fissionable material production to be verified.

As to article IV, the time had come to ensure more effective realization of its provisions. Since the world had moved into an era of co-operation rather than confrontation, a growing number of States parties needed increasing resources for civilian nuclear technology, in areas such as medicine, agriculture, hydrology and food technology. His delegation was disappointed that IAEA and other multilateral agencies had not been given sufficient political and resource support for technical co-operation and assistance in those fields. It was also regrettable that the United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (UNCPICPUNE) and the IAEA Committee on Assurances of Supply had been unable to reach agreement on important subjects of international co-operation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy and supply of nuclear material and services. His delegation hoped that the Conference would give strong support for the establishment of suitable funding mechanisms in those areas.

Regarding article VI, he noted with satisfaction the progress in bilateral negotiations since 1985. The two nuclear super-Powers had concluded the INF Treaty and committed themselves to concluding the START Agreement. However, his Government was disappointed that there had been no agreement on effective limitations, and it thus feared that the quest for a new generation of nuclear weapons would continue.

There had been reports of new nuclear-weapon systems, including submarine-based missiles and cruise missiles. Moreover, even if 3 to 4 per cent of the missiles were destroyed under the INF Treaty, their warheads would be retained. The START Agreement envisaged much less than a 50 per cent reduction, but even after a 50 per cent reduction of the two super-Powers' strategic arsenals, those two countries would have 20 per cent more nuclear warheads than they had had in the early 1970s. Current negotiations had not produced any progress concerning a possible agreement on preventing an arms race in outer space. Research and development were continuing in that field. Sri Lanka was thus seriously concerned at the possibility of an expensive and destabilizing arms race in outer space coupled with the development of new nuclear weapons.

There was an urgent need to conclude a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty. Such a ban was an integral part of the purposes set forth in the preamble and in the provisions of article VI. Moreover, it was seen by a majority of States parties as one of the most effective measures for supporting the NPT. His Government welcomed the step-by-step negotiations taking place between the United States and the Soviet Union for the purposes of limiting the explosive yield of test explosions, and it hoped that their constructive dialogue would enable the Conference to arrive at a parallel commitment to initiate urgent negotiations towards a comprehensive test ban.

It was regrettable that the legitimate demands of the non-nuclear countries for effective security assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons had remained unfulfilled for nearly a quarter of a century. Negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on that subject had not made any progress in the past 10 years.

There had been intense discussions about non-proliferation in the future. All seemed to agree that greater efforts were called for in order to achieve the purposes of the Treaty. His delegation believed that the future of the Treaty should be considered in a positive spirit so as to strengthen

its authority. The Treaty could meet new dangers if the States parties showed the necessary political will to strengthen it. He expected the Treaty to move into the future and not into history.

Mr. SOMOGYI (Republic of Hungary) said that participation by the greatest number of States ever at the Fourth Review Conference showed the growing significance that the community of nations attached to the effective functioning of the non-proliferation régime. It constituted recognition of the paramount political importance of the NPT, which was a contributing factor in reducing the danger of nuclear war and strengthening international peace and security. The NPT was an important stabilizing element in the current system of international relations, which was undergoing rapid but promising changes.

His Government fully subscribed to the political objectives set forth in the NPT and to the obligations aimed at their implementation. It therefore congratulated all the States that had acceded to the Treaty during the past five years and those that had expressed their intention to do so in the near future, and urged all other States to accede to the NPT.

His Government appreciated the fact that the basic provisions of the Treaty had been fulfilled. The nuclear-weapon States had not transferred nuclear weapons to other States, and the non-nuclear-weapon States parties had not acquired nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, concern had been expressed at the nuclear ambitions of certain so-called threshold States not parties to the Treaty. Thus it was crucial for the nuclear policies of States not parties to the NPT to be in harmony with the spirit of the Treaty, thus promoting international peace and security.

It was encouraging to note that significatnt steps had been taken towards halting the nuclear arms race and promoting disarmament. Since the NPT's entry into force, the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range Missiles represented the first agreement eliminating an entire category of nuclear weapons. That initial measure held out favourable prospects. If recent political change was accompanied by political intent, progress in nuclear disarmament would no longer be a mere pipe-dream. His Government earnestly hoped that the Soviet-United States agreement on the reduction of strategic offensive weapons would soon be signed and followed by negotiations on further radical cuts in nuclear weapons.

His delegation deplored the fact that there had been no meaningful progress in the prohibition of nuclear weapons tests. At the same time, it welcomed the steps taken to bring bilateral threshold agreements into force. Negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty could not be delayed any longer. With a new security concept emerging, progress in nuclear disarmament and a comprehensive test ban would be in full harmony with the spirit and letter of the NPT and might lead to the eventual elimination of nuclear deterrence.

Having signed the NPT, the non-nuclear-weapon States had accepted the obligation of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, in the conviction that the nuclear-weapon States would provide guarantees not to threaten them. As a party to the NPT, Hungary required negative security guarantees.

IAEA's safeguards system played a key role in the operation of the non-proliferation régime based on the NPT. Additional countries had concluded safeguards agreements with IAEA, and all the nuclear-weapon States had voluntarily placed under IAEA control all or part of their civilian nuclear facilities. However, his delegation noted with regret that all States parties to the NPT had concluded safeguards agreements with IAEA within the time-limit set in the Treaty. Compliance with obligations under international treaties was an indispensable condition for any country to be a reliable partner within the community of nations.

His Government sought to increase the efficiency of safeguards activities by improving the conditions for the Agency's control in Hungary. It supported all efforts to improve the financial, technical and organizational conditions of the safeguards system. It was firmly convinced that the commitments undertaken as part of the NPT and the IAEA safeguards system had not in any way limited its nuclear activities for peaceful purposes. Its participation in international co-operation activities had enabled it to ensure the safety of its nuclear power plant, to devise modern systems of accounting and reporting nuclear materials, and to undertake research and development programmes. It would continue to participate, as both donor and beneficiary, in the Agency's technical assistance and co-operation programme.

The existing pattern of co-operation between suppliers was an important element in the reliable operation of the non-proliferation régime with regard to nuclear exports. Hungary had implemented the recommendations of the

London Club and the Zangger Committee in that area. The changes that had recently taken place in the country's economic activity would not entail any relaxation of its commitments concerning nuclear exports.

His Government attached paramount importance to those aspects of the non-proliferation régime that had a direct impact on national security and international confidence. As a small country with a high population density, it was in favour of the prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities and had, with Sweden and the Netherlands, sponsored a working paper on that issue. The tragic consequences of Chernobyl indicated that a nuclear catastrophe, regardless of cause, created transboundary perils. The formulation and conclusion of a treaty on the prohibition of armed attacks on nuclear facilities therefore demanded international co-operation.

The far-reaching changes taking place in the world, which were altering old enemy images, aroused hopes that that issue and the modalities for solving it would be addressed in a constructive manner in the concluding document of the Review Conference. Similarly, consideration should be given to the measures to be taken in cases where a State party, by declaring its intention to acquire nuclear-weapons capability, tended to undermine international confidence in the Treaty.

The implementation of the NPT over the past 20 years had not been without its problems, but they could not call the Treaty's authority into question. It was to be hoped that the States parties would be able to formulate, and to adopt by consensus, a substantive concluding document that would reflect their endeavours to strengthen the non-proliferation régime. The outcome of the deliberations would undoubtedly have an effect on the future of the NPT, whose basic objective was to save future generations from the dangers posed by the existence and spread of nuclear weapons. His delegation stood ready to work in a constructive spirit for the success of the Conference.

Mr. KONGSIRI (Thailand) said that he wished to bring 14 points to the attention of the Review Conference. First, his Government reaffirmed its full support for, and commitment to, the NPT and called on all States that were not yet parties to accede to it.

The international community must continue to prevent States from obtaining nuclear explosives - by political, economic and security means. His Government urged nuclear supplier States to control exports and transfers

of technology most carefully, especially "dual-use" exports. It hoped that more supplier States would join the nuclear suppliers' group with its stringent controls and that the Zangger Committee would be strengthened.

His Government was concerned at ballistic missile proliferation and the export of technology to build such missiles, and it urged more adherence to the missile technology control régime (MTCR).

It would like to see those States with unsafeguarded nuclear activities place all the relevant facilities under safeguards.

In extending co-operation and assistance in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, States should ensure that the receiving State was a party to the NPT and applied full-scope IAEA safeguards based on the Treaty. Apparently, only seven countries had adopted such a policy. His Government urged other suppliers to take that most significant step.

In that context, his Government hoped that IAEA would be strengthened financially, and it urged those countries that had not yet paid their dues to fulfil their obligations punctually.

His Government also called on the developed countries to provide to the developing countries parties to the NPT adequate technical assistance and co-operation for peaceful uses of nuclear energy, in order to promote their economic and social development. The implementation of article III (safeguards) and article IV (promotion of peaceful uses of nuclear energy) should be even-handed.

His Government welcomed proposals which would provide more security guarantees that nuclear States would not use nuclear weapons in a possible conflict with non-nuclear countries.

His delegation was pleased that the Partial Test Ban Treaty Amendment Conference would be held in New York in early 1991, and hoped that progress would be made towards nuclear disarmament and a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

It welcomed the new protocols that ensured effective verification of the threshold Test-Ban Treaty and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty, and hoped that the two Treaties would soon be ratified.

His Government was pleased that significant progress had been made towards arms reduction agreements.

It was happy to note that the number of observers to the Conference had increased, and that China and France were participating for the first time.

His delegation endorsed the statement made on 22 August by the representative of Yugoslavia on behalf of the delegations of the non-aligned and other States parties to the NPT not belonging to the East European or Western Groups. However, it noted that that consensus statement amalgamated a variety of views and interests.

Lastly, his delegation would make every effort to help the Conference produce a final document by consensus. Given the improved atmosphere between East and West and between the two super-Powers, it was optimistic about the outcome of the Conference.

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.